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INTRODUCTION

Historically, the natural gas industry and the electric industry have
been regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(F.E.R.C.). The price producers charged for their gas was regulated. The
price interstate pipelines paid for the gas as well as the transportation rate
they charged were regulated. Local distribution company rates were
regulated by state commissions. The prices for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity were regulated both at the federal and
the local level.
In recent years, the energy industry moved away from regulation by
the F.E.R.C. to (de)regulation by competition and market based prices.
This process of regulating by deregulation began when producers were
able to charge non-regulated contract prices for the sale of gas and when
interstate pipelines opened their pipelines to third party shippers.
F.E.R.C.'s natural gas restructuring rule finalized the structural
changes in the (de)regulation of the natural gas industry. By requiring
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pipelines (1) to separate (unbundle) their sales and transportation services,
(2) to provide comparable transportation services for all gas supplies, (3)
to offer access to pipeline storage, and (4) to allow shippers both temporary or permanent capacity release, the evolution to competition in the
natural gas industry was complete.t
Practically speaking, F.E.R.C. transformed pipelines into exclusively transporters of natural gas. The response to F.E.R.C.'s mandate to
unbundle was dramatic. Pipeline companies unbundled sales from transportation services, opened interstate transportation capacity and pipeline
storage capacity to access by any qualified shipper, offered unique and
competitive pipeline services, and centralized the purchasing of natural
gas at market hubs using electronic trading systems.
When pipelines stepped out of the merchant role, local distribution
companies (LDCs) accepted this new responsibility. Regulatory review
shifted from the F.E.R.C. to state commissions. Many of the deregulation
issues faced at the federal level are now being repeated at the local level:
unbundling and rebundling, prudent gas purchase practices, market affiliates, incentive rates, and integrated resource planning.
Enlightened by its experience deregulating the natural gas industry,
F.E.R.C. has now turned to the electric industry with the intent of bringing comparability, open access transmission, market based rates,
unbundled services, and direct access to electric power customers. Mindful of both physical and statutory differences between the natural gas and
the electric power industries, F.E.R.C. issued the electric Mega-NOPR
which commits the Commission to reliance on market driven factors.2 The
Mega-NOPR affects only the transmission of power to wholesale customers (big industrial plants), not retail customers (residential homeowners).
However, F.E.R.C. expects that opening wholesale competition will force
the unbundling of the electric industry at the local level and in time,
lower the cost of electricity for all customers.
The deregulation of the energy industry marks a critical turning
point in the history of the natural gas industry and the electric power
industry. This paper explores the impact that regulating by deregulation
has on the natural gas industry and the application of this experience to
the electric power industry.

1. See infra text accompanying note 3.
2. See infra text accompanying note 181.
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PART 1. DEREGULATION OF THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY

Regulation By Deregulation

After the surpluses and shortages of natural gas supplies in the
1970s and the clamor of producers for less federal control in the
1980s, heretical talk of "regulating" the natural gas industry by deregulation3 crept into the halls of Congress and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (F.E.R.C.). Two magical words: "market-based
rates" and "competition" were announced and would drive the deregulation of the natural gas industry. 4
The first actions were the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of
1989' and F.E.R.C.'s Open Access Transportation Order (Order No. 436)
in response to the Act. 6 The Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act freed
the price of producers' gas at the wellhead from the multi-tiered pricing
restrictions imposed by the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978.' Now producers were able to charge non-regulated contract prices for the sale of
gas from the wellhead.
3. "Regulating" the natural gas industry by deregulation would allow competition and market
place rates to set the price for natural gas rather than the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
4. The unbundling of the pipeline industry began with Order No. 436 which "encouraged"
pipeline companies to open their pipelines to third party shippers. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines
After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42408 (Oct. 18, 1985) (F.E.R.C.
Stats. & Regs. [Regulations Preambles 1982-1985] 30,665, at 31,481-482 (1985)) vacated and remanded, Associated Gas Distributors v. F.E.R.C., 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 1006 (1988), readopted on an interim basis, Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. 30334 (Aug. 14,
1987) (F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. [Regulations Preambles, 1986-1990] 30,761 (1987)) remanded,
American Gas Association v. F.E.R.C., 888 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1989), readopted, Order No. 500H, 54 Fed. Reg. 52344 (Dec. 21, 1989), F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. [Regulations Preambles 19861990] 30,867 (1989), reh'g granted in part and denied in part, Order No. 500-I, 55 Fed. Reg.
6605 (Feb. 26, 1990), (F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. [Regulations Preambles 1986-1990] 30,880 (1990))
affd in part and remanded in part, American Gas Association v. F.E.R.C., 912 F.2d 1496 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991). (Order No. 436); [hereinafter Order No. 436].
5. Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, 15 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (West 1982 & Supp.
1995).
6. Order No. 436, supra note 4.
7. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), § 311, 15 U.S.C. § 3371 (1988). The major provisions of this Act related to:
'a single national market for gas sales, eliminating the jurisdictional sale-nonjurisdictional
sale distinction; extension of price controls on gas until January 1, 1985 . . . ; a national
price ceiling for gas escalated with inflation and annual increases until 1985, with special
provisions for gas sold under existing intrastate contracts, sales under rollover contracts,
high cost natural gas, and stripper well natural gas; incremental pricing of natural gas to
industrial users in order to insulate residential consumers from price increases and presidential authority to allocate gas in emergencies."
HOWARD WILLIAMS AND CHARLES MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, (Matthew Bender

ed., 1991).
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The F.E.R.C. Open Access Transportation Order encouraged pipeline companies to open their pipelines voluntarily to third party shippers.
While this was a "voluntary" undertaking, F.E.R.C. provided sufficient
carrot-and-stick incentives for pipeline companies to comply with the order, and third party shippers (producers, marketers, aggregators) began to
transport gas on these open access pipelines. 8
While both the Wellhead Decontrol Act and voluntary open access
transportation provided increased supply options, these changes were not
enough to bring about the federal regulators' vision of market-based rates and
competition. This would be accomplished by the issuance of F.E.R.C.'s
natural gas restructuring rule (Order No. 636) in the spring of 1992.'
As stated in Order No. 636, the rule
will finalize the structural changes in the Commission's regulation
of the natural gas industry. This rule will therefore reflect and finally complete the evolution to competition in the natural gas industry.

. .[T]his

promotion of competition among gas suppliers

will benefit all gas consumers and the nation by ensur[ing] an adequate and reliable supply of [clean and abundant] natural gas at
the lowest reasonable price.' 0
Order No. 636 unraveled the regulated gas industry and in the words of
F.E.R.C. Chair Elizabeth Moler, "[T]here is no going back."" The
restructuring of the natural gas industry was greeted by pipeline companies initially with angst and animosity; given to hyperbole, some pipeline
company executives cried that Order No. 636 was a Pearl Harbor attack
on the industry.
To achieve the regulators' vision, Order No. 636 required pipelines
to separate (unbundle) 2 their sales and transportation services and to
8. Order No. 436, supra note 4.
9. Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self Implementing
Transportation; and Regulations of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order
No. 636, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (April 16, 1992) (3 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. Preambles 30,939
(April 8, 1992)); order on reh'g, Order No.636-A, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,128 (August 12, 1992) (3
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. Preambles 30,950 (August 3, 1992)) order on reh'g, Order No. 636-1, 57
Fed. Reg. 57,911 (December 8, 1992), (61 F.E.R.C.

61,272 (November 27, 1992)), appeal pend-

ing sub nom. Atlanta Gas Light Co., et al. v. F.E.R.C., No. 92-8782, (1lth Cir. Aug. 13, 1992).
[hereinafter Order No. 636].
10. Id. See also Harold, Walker, FORTNIGHTLY, Paying The Piper,Apr. 15, 1994, at 33; (Order No. 636, 3 F.E.RC. Stats. & Regs. Preambles at 1 30,391).
11. Elizabeth Anne Moler, There is No Going Back, FORTNIGHTLY, Oct. 15, 1993, at 51.
12. Prior to the issuance of Order No. 636, pipeline companies charged a bundled rate for

natural gas; this bundled rate included the purchase of gas and its transportation. In some instances,
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provide comparable transportation services for all gas supplies, whether
purchased from the pipeline or a third party. 3 Order No. 636 required
pipelines to offer open access pipeline storage on a non-discriminatory
firm shippers to rebasis and to create capacity release programs to allow
4
permanently.'
or
temporarily
capacity
their
lease
Order No. 636 transformed pipelines exclusively into transporters of
natural gas.' Even though F.E.R.C. assured pipeline companies that
Order No. 636 was not meant to force them out of the merchant role, in
reality, no major pipelines continued as merchants. In those instances
where the company remains a merchant, the sale of gas is usually handled
by a marketing affiliate or subsidiary of the company. The era of pipeline
as merchant is defunct; the era of pipeline as transporter has dawned.
PART

2. DEREGULATION OF NATURAL GAS PIPELINES

In response to the Order No. 636 mandate, the natural gas pipeline
industry has changed dramatically. Pipeline companies have unbundled sales
from transportation services, and opened interstate transportation capacity and
pipeline storage capacity to access by any qualified shipper on a firm or
interruptible basis.16 Market hubs developed; unique and competitive pipeline
services are offered;' 7 natural gas is traded as a commodity.
Pipeline Market Centers Or Market Hubs
The market center or market hub is defined as a "reliability center"
where "many pipelines meet in a reasonably small geographic region."' s This

the bundled rate might also include gathering and processing costs. Separating sales service from
transportation service required the pipeline companies to price each service separately and allowed
customers to choose only those services they required.
13. Order No. 636, supra note 9.
14. Id.
15. INGAA "s Annual Pipeline Survey Shows Continuing Decline In Pipeline Sales As Demand
For CarriageGrows, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, June 30, 1994, at 27. In fact, Interstate Natu-

ral Gas Association of America's (INGAA) annual pipeline survey "documents the transition between
the pre-636 era of bundled gas service and the unbundled post-636 world." The survey showed pipeline sales dwindling to 10% of all 1993 gas volumes delivered, with the decreases in pipeline sales
"balanced by an increase in firm transportation, and to some extent, by the first released firm transportation flowing from the capacity release market." Id.
16. Order No. 636, 3 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. Preambles, at 30,426. See 18 C.F.R.
§ 284. 1(a).
17. See infra text accompanying note 49.
18. F.E.R.C. 's OEP Director Richard O'Neill Recommends Self-Regulation Of Regional Gas
Market Hubs Operating Within GeographicalLimits, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, May 12, 1994,
at 12 [hereinafter O'Neill.
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concept has brought gas marketing sophistication to the natural gas industry.
Market hubs encourage market based rates and increase post-636 competition
by increasing reliability and trading opportunities; the role of market hubs in
the natural gas industry is described as follows:
[L]inked by electronic trading systems displaying near-real
time market data.

. . market

hubs] form a nationwide clearing

house in which any seller across North America would be able
to offer supplies to the highest bidders, any buyer could find a
smorgasbord of gas supplies and select the source best suited to
his needs, and any shipper on equal footing with all other
players could obtain the services he needed to efficiently move
purchased volumes to end users.' 9
Because market hubs embody the regulatory vision of competition,
F.E.R.C. has actively encouraged market centers by: (1) prohibiting rate
design or tariff language which frustrates market centers, (2) preferring fully
unbundled services which has made market centers easier to develop, and (3)
creating a complementary capacity release market.'
The proliferation of market centers is the first stage of an industry
metamorphosis. Currently more than forty2' existing and proposed market
centers are located at "natural pooling points" with multiple pipeline interconnections sitting midstream between major gas supply and market areas on
underutilized interstate gas transportation systems with downstream sales
capability and access to upstream supply areas.' This large number of market centers will not continue. "Shakeout is imminent. Competitive pressures
are increasing. . .I[Tjhe numbers will dwindle down to a handful." 3 With
market centers or market hubs appearing nationwide, competition will be especially fierce in the initial stages of development.'

19. Id.at28.
20. Id. at 12. Not everyone would agree with this analysis of F.E.R.C.'s supportive role:
"F.E.R.C. failed to keep its promise not to inhibit development of the centers. Production area hubs
are a casualty of F.E.R.C.'s inability to resolve .. production area rate zone rates... Production area
rate hubs are eroding as market zone hubs proliferate." Texas Conference Portrays Market Centers As
The StandardFor Natural Gas TransactionBusiness In The Future; ParticipantsDebate Definitions,
F.E.R.C. 's Role, And Impact Of Competition, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, May 12, 1994, at14
[hereinafter Texas Conference].
21. Approximately one and one-half years ago, Coopers and Lybrand counted about fifteen existing and planned market hubs. That number has burgeoned from fifteen to twenty-six to forty in a
very short period of time! A.D. Koen, U.S. Natural Gas Hubs Symbolize Order 636 Marketing Evolution, OIL & GAS JOURNAL, Sept. 5, 1994, at 27 [hereinafter U.S. Natural Gas Hubs].
22. U.S. Natural Gas Hubs, supra note 21, at 30.
23. Id.
24. Already plans for one market hub have been dropped. On August 22, 1994, Mid Louisiana
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Numerous pipeline companies have applied for and received authorization from F.E.R.C. for market centers. Each application is very individual,
listing various geographical areas and pipeline interconnects and offering a
variety of competitive services.
However, F.E.R.C. has rejected an enhanced hub application from
Northern Illinois Gas Co. and Southern California Gas Co. which would
have extended their services to include their capacity rights on other pipelines. 26 F.E.R.C. rejected this off-system service stating that the application
violated the shipper-must-have-title rule, evaded capacity release procedures,
and was a return to now illegal buy/sell transactions.27
Market hubs are evolving into natural gas "supermarkets" where gas
services are increasingly bought and sold and will be integrally related to
short-term markets.' Market hubs will become the primary pricing points for
the industry and may supplant utilities' formal monthly spot gas bidding

Gas Co. withdrew its proposal to reduce rates on a four-mile lateral in order to encourage its use as a
market hub. Compliance with the conditions imposed by the F.E.R.C. would require additional expenditures; "given the speculative nature of the new business estimated to be generated by its (market
hub) proposal," Mid Louisiana Gas Co. withdrew its proposal. Mid Louisiana Gas Co. "Order Accepting and Suspending Certain Tariff Sheets Subject to Refund and Conditions and Rejecting Certain
Tariff Sheets," Docket No. RP94-322-000, 68 F.E.R.C. 61,229 (Aug. 12, 1994). Mid Louisiana
Drops Plan To Use T-32 Lateral As Market Hub Due To Additional Costs Required To Comply With
F.E.R.C. Authorization, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Aug. 25, 1994, at I.
25. The first pipeline to apply for hub services was National Fuel Gas Supply, requesting authorization for parking, wheeling and imbalance resolution; F.E.R.C. granted this request on January
12, 1994 subject to the outcome of a technical conference. National Fuel Gas Supply Corp., "Order
Accepting and Suspending Tariff Sheets, Subject to Refund and Conditions, Rejecting Other Tariff
Sheets, and Establishing a Technical Conference," Docket Nos. RP94-80-000, et al., 66 F.E.R.C.
61,031 (Jan. 12, 1994). See also Pacific Gas Transmission Company, Docket No. RP94-145-000,
"Order Accepting and Suspending Tariff Sheets Subject to Refund, and Establishing a Technical Con61,356 (Mar. 25, 1994); CNG Transmission Corporation, Docket Nos.
ference," 66 F.E.R.C.
RP94-213-O00, et al., "Order Accepting and Suspending Tariff Sheets, Subject To Refund And Conditions, And Consolidating Proceedings," 67 F.E.R.C. 61,349 (June 20, 1994); Southern California
Gas Company, "Order Extending Time For Action," Docket No. RP94-16-000, 69 F.E.R.C.
61,097 (Oct. 27, 1994); CMS Gas Transmission and Storage Co., Tejas Power Corp., St. Clair
Pipelines, and Enron Gas Services Corp. - Grands Lacs Market Center, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Apr. 21, 1994, at 30; K N Interstate Gas Transmission Co., Docket Nos. RP95-35-000, etal.,
"Order Accepting And Suspending Tariff Sheets, Subject To Refund And Conditions," 69 F.E.R.C.
61,287 (Dec. 2, 1994); Tejas Power PartnersWith Four CorporationsTo Form Market Hub Chain,
FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Jan- 5, 1995, at 28.

26. Northern Illinois Gas Co. and Southern California Gas Co., "Order On Petition For Rate
Approval And Order Amending Statement Of Operating Conditions," Docket No. CP92-481-000, et
al., 70 F.E.R.C. 61,099 (Jan. 30, 1995).
27. Historically, the shipper held title or could show proof of ownership of the natural gas
which was being shipped. See also Rejecting Hub Plans Could Hurt Efficiency, GAS DAILY, Mar. 3,
1995, at 1; F.E.R.C. Rules That Hub Providers May Not Extend Services Beyond Their Own Facilities, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Feb. 2, 1995, at 4.

28. Growing Role Of Storage Projects And Market Centers PredictedFor California Gas Markets, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, July 28, 1994, at 12.
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programs. 9 When fully implemented, real time metering will boost the demand for hub services. In addition, a two-tier hub structure will emerge:
primary hub points in major production/market areas and regional or satellite
hubs in secondary production/market areas.3"
New Pipeline Market Centers Or Market Hub Services
In order to be successful, the hub or market center must offer
flexible buying and selling, the availability of long term contracting
and hourly trading, uniform electronic markets, futures trading, and
capacity release transactions.31 "Hub operators are expected to offer
unique services to users, services such as wheeling, . . . title transfer,
displacement delivery, parking, inverse parking and imbalance penalty
management . . .Hub operators will be the future market-makers, fea-

turing full service menus. "32
Another hub service which is becoming more widely used is electronic trading systems. With an electronic market hub trading network,
traders can track gas price differentials among all the hubs and buy gas
daily in a transaction-intensive manner at any hub linked to the net.33 In
time, large regional hubs will be tied together by a unified electronic trading network; a master hub electronic trading system is in the future. 3
Many believe that including all large regional hubs on the network will
lower gas costs volumetrically. 3

29. Id.

30. Id.
31. O'Neill, supra note 18, at 12.
32. While these services may vary from pipeline to pipeline, the following are the most common new hub services.
Parking - delivery of gas into the hub and "parking" or short-term storage at the hub for a
very short term - (one or more days);
Parked Quantity Delivery - transportation of parked quantities of gas from the parking
point to an identified delivery point;
Loaning -removal of gas from the hub and its return one or more days later;
Wheeling - simultaneous receipt of gas into the hub and delivery of gas out of the hub
through displacement or exchanges at different receipt and delivery locations;
Pooling -aggregation of gas at the pool;
Authorized Imbalance - hub operator (transporter) will advance gas to shippers who will
return the volumes to the hub operator at a later date or upon notice from the operator.
PIPE LINE INDUSTRY, Jan., 1994, at 13.
33. U.S. Natural Gas Hubs, supra note 21, at 32. "The electronic data interchange could provide arbitrage opportunities on a national basis so shippers could wheel gas tovarious parts of the
country .... And if we could include main hubs in Canada and the border crossing points between
the U.S. and Mexico, maybe we could start creating our vision of what an international electronic hub
trading system ought to provide in terms of information and services." Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Uniformity At Market Centers
Uniformity of gas terms and flexibility to move gas from one pipeline system to another are essential to the success of market hubs.36 To
facilitate the use of market centers by shippers, pipeline industry leaders
should develop uniform tariff language for industry terms such as: gas
day,37 nomination deadlines, 38 daily balancing,39 electronic bulletin
boards,' real time measurement and flow control, 4 data interchange, and
environmental monitoring.42

Although F.E.R.C. is concerned with uniformity of standards at
market centers, it has not attempted to "regulate" uniformity. F.E.R.C.
Commissioner Santa wondered if the Commission "should initiate proceedings to change rates, terms and conditions believed to discourage
hubs, scrutinize pipeline rate design with respect to its effect on market
centers, or insist on greater uniformity of pipeline business practices and
standards" rather than allowing the pipeline industry to develop the uniformity of gas terms at the market centers or hubs." 3 Santa also consid36. Interstate Natural Gas Association task force has recommended steps to assist integration of
the deregulated natural gas industry. INGAA Details Ways To Improve Gas Grid Integration, OIL &
GAS JOURNAL, Mar. 20, 1995, at 122.
37. Gas day is typically defined in a pipeline's tariff as a period of twenty-four consecutive
hours beginning and ending at 8:00 a.m., unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.
38. A nomination deadline is the time period by which a shipper must notify the pipeline of the
volumes of natural gas which it intends to transport on the pipeline. Monthly nomination deadlines
vary according to the pipeline but typically are between three to five days before the first day of the
month. In connection with pipeline restructuring, various pipelines moved monthly nomination deadlines closer to the first day of the month in order to accommodate customer demands that pipelines
allow for greater flexibility in the timing of nominations.
39. If a balance of receipts and deliveries is not maintained, Seller may impose one or more
imbalance charges as described in the pipeline tariff. Daily balancing is the process by which a pipeline insures that receipt of natural gas equal deliveries of natural gas on a daily basis.
40. Electronic Bulletin Boards (EBB) are interactive electronic systems maintained by a pipeline through which customers or potential customers and a pipeline can communicate with each other,
typically concerning matters such as available upstream capacity, requests for service, the posting of
released capacity, the submission of bids for released capacity, or the posting of other operational notices.
41. Real time measurement and flow control allow a pipeline to receive information concerning
the volume of gas currently flowing on the pipeline. Real time measurement also allows pipelines to
track the ownership and billing status of current flowing gas. The availability of real time information
is essential if a pipeline wishes to require that shippers comply with the pipeline's daily nomination
and balancing requirements.
42. F.E.R.C. Order No. 563 "Standards for Electronic Bulletin Boards Required Under Part
284 of the Commission's Regulations," Docket No. RM93-4, 3 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,988
(Dec. 23, 1993), set standards for the operation of electronic bulletin boards. Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and other communications standards will "foster arbitrage" between hubs, and make
EBBs more customer friendly. The Gas Industry Standards Board (GISB) will also foster uniformity
and standardization within the industry. Texas Conference, supra note 20, at 14.
43. Commissioner Santa Discusses What's Ahead For F.E.R.C., Both Near Term And Long
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ered applying the regional transmission group (RTG) electric concept to
the gas industry; F.E.R.C. would accept the hub group's tariff filings
setting out rules for doing business at a hub." "This would achieve consistency in the operation of the multiple pipelines that access a hub without the need for heavy handed regulatory intervention."'45
According to F.E.R.C. Office of Economic Policy Director Richard
O'Neill, F.E.R.C.'s policy is to "let the market develop the market centers."" However, neither Commissioner Santa nor O'Neill closed the
door on F.E.R.C. intervention.47 If market forces inhibit the development
of market centers and therefore inhibit competition, F.E.R.C. will define
uniform tariff terms for pipelines using market centers.4
New Pipeline TransportationServices
In addition to the exotic new services offered at market centers or
hubs, pipelines are competing for customers by revising their current tariffs to allow greater flexibility for firm transportation and for interruptible
transportation.49 Such transportation services include hourly scheduling
flexibility,5" paper-pooling points, 5 and enhanced transportation rights.52

Term, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, July 21, 1994, at 1. F.E.R.C. has received at least one filing
requesting that it address the creation of market centers, contending that "de facto development of a
market center policy is not enough." The City of Hamilton, Ohio has requested that F.E.R.C. designate Lebanon, Ohio as a market center and require the five interconnecting pipelines (ANR Pipeline
Co., Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., CNG Transmission Corp., Texas Eastern Transmission
Corp., and Texas Gas Transmission Corp.) to modify their tariffs to remove any impediments to the
development of Lebanon as a market center. City of Hamilton Seeks Policy Statement Designating
Lebanon, Ohio As Gas Market Center As One Step Toward 'More Proactive"F.E.R. C. Role, FOSTER
NATURAL GAS REPORT, May 26, 1994, at 16.
44. Commissioner Santa Discusses What's Ahead For F.E.R.C., Both Near Term And Long
Term, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, July 21, 1994, at 1.
45. Id.
46. O'Neill, supra note 18, at 12.
47. The GAO Report "Natural Gas Regulation: Little Opposition to F.E.R.C.'s Recent Policies
On Transportation-Related Services" (GAO/RCED-95-39) concludes that it is too early to determine
what F.E.R.C.'s regulatory role should be, if any. GAO Reports Relatively Little Or No Industry Opposition To Recent F.E.R.C. Regulatory Policies Regarding Pipeline Gathering Affiliates, MarketBased Storage Rates and Market Hubs, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Jan. 12, 1995, at 33.
48. Id.
49. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company filed tariff sheets last year to provide new hourly scheduling flexibility service for interruptible transportation. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, "Order Accepting Tariff Sheets Subject To Conditions," Docket No. RP94-187-O00, 67 F.E.R.C. 61,316
(June 14, 1994).
50. The new hourly scheduling flexibility for interruptible transportation service allows a shipper to change its nominations with 60 minutes prior notice at any time of the day to reflect changes in
quantities tobe delivered under the transportation contract related to qualified receipt and delivery
points. This new service will meet the needs of electric generator customers who need short notice
transportation service to meet their fluctuating peak load. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co. has implement-
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Pipeline Capacity Release
To increase transportation volumes, F.E.R.C. envisioned a robust
secondary transportation market engineered by its capacity release program.53 Under Order No. 636, capacity release allowed customers who
hold contracts for firm pipeline capacity to release it (either temporarily
or permanently) for use by other parties. The customer's ability to
release unused capacity would "minimize the net cost of firm transmission
capacity to their ratepayers .... The capacity-related revenues generated
by such transactions are then credited against the bills rendered to the
original capacity holder under the pipeline's contract.""
What F.E.R.C. expected and what F.E.R.C. is getting are proving
to be two different things. Increased capacity release transactions will
affect market hub operations; however, minimal reliance on capacity
release among pipeline companies and most local distribution companies
exists, and more short term capacity release transactions have occurred
than long term ones.56

ed ten paper pooling points which will allow customers to purchase gas at receipt points and bring the
gas to a pool without being charged a transportation rate, except for gathering charges if applicable.
Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., "Order On Third Compliance Filing And Granting And Denying Request For Rehearing," Docket No. RS 92-26-007, et al., 65 F.E.R.C. 1 61,338 (Dec. 16, 1993).
51. Id. Koch Gateway Proposes To Establish Pooling Service, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT,
Apr. 14, 1994, at 21. Koch's paper pooling points apply transportation charges to the movement of
gas from the pool to a delivery point on an interruptible basis. A firm shipper with a primary receipt
point in a specific pooling area could assign primary receipt point capacity within pooling areas to a
pooling customer supplying it gas at the pooling points. The pooling customer could then use that
capacity to serve the firm customer's transportation needs. Questar Pipeline Co. filed revised tariff
sheets to implement a new Receipt Point Group (RPG) service concept which provides additional
flexibility to firm transportation customers by allowing customers who hold firm primary capacity to
nominate all or any portion of that capacity to any other available receipt point within the RPG;
F.E.R.C. adopted this proposal. Questar Pipeline Company, "Letter Order," Docket Nos. RP94-2 1061,218 (May 20, 1994).
000, et at., 67 F.E.R.C.
52. Questar Pipeline Company, "Letter Order," Docket Nos. RP94-210-000, et at., 67
F.E.R.C. 61,218 (May 20, 1994). Questar Proposes New Service Providing Firm Shippers Greater
Flexibility To Nominate Alternate Receipt Points In Same Area, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT,
Apr. 28, 1994, at 19. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. proposed to implement tariff sheets providing "enhanced transportation rights" to its customers in its market zones, allowing customers to deliver gas in one market zone without limiting the customer's capacity rights in a downstream market
zone. F.E.R.C. accepted this "enhanced transportation" proposal subject to refund and a technical
conference. Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, "Order Accepting And Suspending Tariff
Sheets, Subject To Refund And Conditions, And Establishing A Technical Conference," Docket No.
61,385 (Sept. 29, 1994).
RP94-357-000, 68 F.E.R.C.
53. Order No. 636, supra note 9.
54. Id.
55. Gas Capacity Release: Opportunity or Pitfall? FORTNIGHTLY, Dec. 1, 1993, at 25.
56. Relying on a study performed by Hadson Gas Systems, the following information was
uncovered about capacity release: 1) 6 percent of the total natural gas volumes transported over
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In particular, F.E.R.C. must address these capacity release issues:
"(1) the requirement to post releases in excess of 30 days;57 (2) the requirement that the shippers have title to the gas.

.

. ; (3) the current price

cap (the pipeline's maximum firm transportation (FT) rate);"58 and (4)
pipelines' ability to acquire available transportation and storage capacity
on other pipelines .

9

Disappointed with the lack of enthusiasm for capacity release,
F.E.R.C. agreed to review the Order No. 636 capacity release mechanism by issuing a list of questions' and by inviting a number of gas

the past six months have been moved through released capacity; 2) four pipelines (El Paso
Natural Gas Co., Pacific Gas Transmission Co., Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., Natural
Gas Pipeline Co. of America) have accounted for 55 percent of the capacity released; 3) most
capacity releases are prearranged for a short term; 4) a "gray market" has developed which
involves transactions that make use of regulated firm transportation rebundled with unregulated
sales of gas to serve markets that otherwise would rely on either interruptible or released firm
transportation service; 5) there is a lack of participation in capacity release transactions by
many large LDCs; 6) affiliate related capacity releases play a relatively minor role, amounting
to less than 5 percent of the national total volume released; and 7) pipelines' discounted IT
service has directly competed with capacity released to the same markets by their LDC customers. The Hadson study is entitled: The Rumble of Bundles: A Review of Experience Under the
Capacity Release Experiment. Hadson Executive Analyzes Capacity Release Programs In The
Interstate Gas Market, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Sept. 1, 1994, at 1; Capacity Release
Yields Bargains, But Business Isn't Brisk Everywhere, INSIDE F.E.R.C., Aug. 29, 1994, at 1;
Order No. 636 Capacity Release Program Gets Critical Airing At Gas Industry Conference,
FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Sept. 8, 1994, at 2 [hereinafter Order No. 636 Capacity Release].
57. Initially, F.E.R.C. refused to alter the definition of a short term prearranged capacity
release of one month or less when it denied Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America's request. See
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, "Order Accepting Certain Tariff Sheets, Subject to Conditions,
And Rejecting Other Tariff Sheets," Docket No. RP94-255-O0, et at., 67 F.E.R.C. 61,385 (June
23, 1994). Chair Moler stated that the industry should continue to "play the release game before we
change the rules." Moler Suggests That Less Regulation May Be The Best For Gas Market, INSIDE
F.E.R.C., Sept. 12, 1994, at 11.
58. Order No. 636 Capacity Release, supra note 56, at 3. The F.E.R.C. refused to alter the
definition of a short term prearranged capacity release to one month or less when it denied Natural
Gas Pipeline Co. of America's request in Docket No. RP94-255. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, et al., "Order Accepting Certain Tariff Sheets, Subject to Conditions, and Rejecting Other Tariff
Sheets," Docket No. RP94-255-000, et al., 67 F.E.R.C. 1 61,385 (June 23, 1994). However this
position was changed in Order No. 577 and Order No. 577-A. See infra note 62.
59. Pipeline Seeks Uniformity On Capacity Rights, GAS DAILY, Mar. 6, 1995, at 1.
60. Among the fourteen Capacity Release Outreach Questions, the following were asked:
"What are the strengths and weaknesses of the program? What needs to be changed? Has the lack of
uniform operational rules on different pipelines hindered capacity release transactions involving multiple pipelines? Are price caps on released capacity necessary? Has the lack of uniform operational
rules on different pipelines hindered release transactions involving multiple pipelines? Is there a perception that prearranged deals are preferable over bidding? What would be the effect of permitting the
sale of capacity directly between shippers without posting and bidding? Why are buy/sell, and bundled capacity/gas transactions, the so-called 'gray market,' being used as an alternative to the capacity
release program?" Staff Solicits Industry Views on Workings Of Capacity-Release Program, INSIDE
F.E.R.C., Oct. 3, 1994, at 1. F.E.R.C. Staff To Hold Information Meetings With Industry Groups To
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industry members to informal discussions on the topic.6' On January
12, 1995, F.E.R.C. issued a proposed rulemaking that altered the
short term prearranged capacity release to thirty days. This rule would
end the large number of release transactions which involved the pairing of a twenty-nine day prearranged release with a one day deal with
the same terms to avoid the bidding process.62 This is the first substantive change to the capacity release rules outlined in Order No. 636.
New Pipeline Storage Services
To enhance competition, Order No. 636 unbundled pipeline storage
capacity allowing access by any qualified shipper.63 Many independent
pipelines and "storage" marketers are assessing available storage and are
considering installing or expanding seasonal and peaking gas storage facilities in supply and market areas.' With storage now playing a vital role

Find Out How CapacityRelease ProgramIs Working Prior To Scheduling Public Conference, FOSTER
NATURAL GAS REPORT, Oct. 6, 1994, at 9.
61. These informal meetings occurred in October and November, 1994. INGAA suggested that
the revenue crediting requirement for Interruptible Transportation (IT) volumes be eliminated; that
calendar-month prearranged deals be allowed; that the complaint procedure should be used by
F.E.R.C. to address Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) posting issues; and that pipeline affiliates should
be treated no differently than other marketers who participate in the secondary market. "Recommendation of the Rate & Policy Analysis Committees on the Capacity Release Market," INGAA White
Paper, Oct. 12, 1994.
62. Release Of Firm Capacity On Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, "Notice Of Proposed
Rulemaking," Docket No. RM95-5-000, 70 F.E.R.C. 61,019 (Jan. 12, 1995); F.E.R.C. Proposes
Capacity Release Changes, ENERGY DAILY, Jan. 13, 1995, at 4; Industry Responds to Capacity Release Change, GAS DAILY, Feb. 24, 1995, at 2; F.E.R.C. Issues Notice Of ProposedRule To Make
PrearrangedOne Month Capacity Releases Exempt From PostingAnd Bidding Requirements, FOSTER
NATURAL GAS REPORT, Jan. 12, 1995, at 1. F.E.R.C. issued Order No. 577 making this change to
capacity release. Order No. 577, 70 F.E.R.C. 61,359 (Mar. 29, 1995); Order No. 577-A, Ordering
Granting Rehearing, 71 F.E.R.C. 61,254 (May 31, 1995).
63. Order No. 636, 3 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. Preambles at 30,426; see 18 C.F.R. §
284.1(a) (Apr. 8, 1992). Since Order No. 636 allowed pipelines to retain only enough storage and
transportation capacity to maintain operational control of the interstate transportation system and to
provide no-notice service, access to storage is now available to producers and end users. Indeed, the
American Gas Association states that more than "3 tcf of working gas will be in storage for the coming winter peak demand periods" and that "[sitorage withdrawals this winter are expected to account
for about 5 % of U.S. interstate gas pipeline non-peak month throughput, firm transportation volumes
71%, interruptible transportation 17 %, and no-notice and pipeline system gas the balance." F.E.R.C.
Order 636 Spawns Flurry Of U.S. Gas Storage Projects, OIL & GAS JOURNAL, Oct. 1993, at 21
[hereinafter Flurry Of U.S. Gas Storage].
64. Historically, storage was built for seasonal use under a rate based system; a "one size fits
all" seasonal storage facility which some believe is overbuilt in the market area but high deliverability
storage is under built in both the market and producing areas. F.E.R.C. Order 636 Spawns Flurry Of
U.S. Gas Storage Projects, OIL & GAS JOURNAL, Oct. 1993, at 21 [hereinafter Flurry Of U.S. Gas
Storage]. Avoca Natural Gas Storage Open Season Extended, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Feb.
17, 1994, at 30. High deliverability storage such as salt dome storage - currently a small percentage
of total storage capacity - will increase significantly as it can cycle completely up to ten times a year.
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in the supply chain, it is entirely possible that "storage capacity could be-

come a commodity as valuable as gas."'
While F.E.R.C. has not directly addressed the interplay between
market centers and storage, the pipeline industry has linked the two
through hub agreements. Like hubs, storage facilities can provide balancing services, short-term inventory balancing, incremental supplies and
demand, and operational flexibility for shippers.' "It is arguable that
these hub services are rebundled storage services ... 67
F.E.R.C. has authorized market-based rates for storage services.68
The first market area storage project to seek and obtain approval of negotiated rates was Avoca Natural Gas Storage. 69 F.E.R.C. determined that:
(1) a salt dome storage facility would be in the public convenience and necessity; (2) Avoca can provide peak period supply, balancing and gas price arbitrage in competition with
similar services already provided by conventional and LNG
storage in the area; and (3) Avoca will be unable to exercise

65. Flurry Of U.S. Gas Storage Projects, supra note 63, at 21.
66. Texas Conference Portrays Market Centers As The StandardFor Natural Gas Transaction
Business In The Future; ParticipantsDebate Definitions, F.E.R.C.'s Role, And Impact Of Competition, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, May 12, 1994, at 14. One such example is the proposed Alberta Energy Partnership storage and market center project. Development of this 2,500 acre $5 million
project would "provide an independent gas storage alternative for California non-core customers who
traditionally have had to rely on the storage services of the state's two major public utilities. . . .A
number of other HUB and market center services would be offered to satisfy the requirements of the
California gas marketplace." Alberta Energy Partnership Exploring Kern County, California Gas
Storage ProjectAnd Market Center, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Mar. 31, 1994, at 20.
67. Alberta Energy PartnershipExploring Kern County, CaliforniaGas Storage Project And
Market Center, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Mar. 31, 1994, at 20.

68. Historically, F.E.R.C. authorized cost based rates - rates based on the pipeline's cost of
service. However, F.E.R.C. may authorize market based rates - rates set by competition if market
forces can keep prices at reasonable levels. Among these are Koch Gateway Pipeline Co. out of its
Bistineau Storage Facility in Webster Parish, Louisiana (42.5 Bef); Bay Gas Storage Co. Ltd. in association with a new salt dome storage cavern being constructed jointly with Olin Corp. in Washington
County, Alabama (1.5 Bcf);
Richfield Gas Storage System from underground storage in Morton
County, Kansas (3.5 Bcf); Petal Gas Storage Co. in Mississippi (1.6 Bcf); and Transok, Inc. (4.0
Bcf) F.E.R.C. Grants PreliminaryApproval Of Avoca's Market-Based Storage Services In Consumption Area Based On Extensive Evaluation Of Competitive Conventional Storage And LNG Alternatives,
FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, June 30, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Preliminary Approval]. F.E.R.C.
Approves Koch Gateway's Request To Charge Negotiated Rates For Unbundled Storage Service,
FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Mar. 31, 1994, at 6 [hereinafter F.E.R.C.Approves Koch Gateway].
Recently an intrastate pipeline, Llano Inc.'s market based transmission and storage rates were approved by F.E.R.C. Intrastate Seeks Market-Based Rates For Storage And Transportation, INSIDE
F.E.R.C., Oct. 17, 1994, at 11.
69. Preliminary Approval, supra note 68, at 4. Avoca Natural Gas Storage, "Preliminary
Determination On Non-Environmental Issues," 68 F.E.R.C. 1 61,045 (July 8,1994); Avoca Natural
Gas Storage, "Order Issuing Certificates," 68 F.E.R.C. 61,333 (Sept. 20, 1994).
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market power because it is small relative to the alternatives
available to customers, because market concentration for shortterm peak supply services is low, and because other factors
temper Avoca's ability to exercise power where market concentration for other services is high."7"
Several applications for market based storage rates have run aground
at the F.E.R.C. absent evidence of lack of market power. Neither Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. nor Cove Point LNG Limited Partnership were
successful in their bid for market-based storage rates. 7 Not all certificate
applications for storage facilities request market based rates. F.E.R.C. approved Young Gas Storage Co. Ltd.'s application to develop and operate
a natural gas storage field at cost-based rates.72
Recognition of the important role storage will play has encouraged
numerous pipelines to consider adding storage projects to their future
plans. Both Southern California Gas Co. and Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
have proposed unbundled storage programs in California for non-core
customers. The storage program will offer load balancing, basic long term
contract, short term and off-season storage services.73 Alberta Energy
Partnership is considering development and operation of the Ten Section
Hub. The project would be located near all five California pipeline sys-

70. For additional market-based storage applications, see Ouachita River Gas Storage Co.'s application to construct and operate an underground storage facility at market based rates. Ouachita
River Gas Storage Company, L.L.C., "Preliminary Determination On Nonenviromnental Issues,"
Docket No. CP94-38-000, 68 F.E.R.C.

61,402 (Sept. 30, 1994); and Koch Gateway Pipeline

Company's application to charge market based rates for production area unbundled storage service.
The Koch application was embraced enthusiastically by the F.E.R.C. Commissioners "generally

agreeing that the Koch Gateway's market power analysis could serve as a model for other entities
seeking to implement negotiated rates." F.E.R.C. Approves Koch Gateway, supra note 68, at 6; Koch
Gateway Pipeline Company, "Order On Market-Based Contract Storage Rates," 66 F.E.R.C.
61,385 (Mar. 31, 1994).

71. Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, "Order Granting In Part Approval Of Rate Petition," 68 F.E.R.C.

61,090 (July 19, 1994). See also F.E.R.C. Grants MichCon's Request To

Charge State-Approved Rates For Transportation Service, But Denies Market-Based Rate ForStorage
Service, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, July 14, 1994, at 11. Cove Point LNG Limited Partnership,
"Order Denying Price Cap Proposal, Denying Rehearing, Granting Clarification, Authorizing Abandonments, And Issuing Certificates," Docket Nos. CP94-59-000, et al. 68 F.E.R.C.

28, 1994); "Order Denying Reconsideration," 69 F.E.R.C.

61,377, (Sept.

61,292 (Dec. 5, 1994). See also

F.E.R.C. Approves Recommissioning Of Cove Point LNG FacilitiesBut Nixes Market-Based Rates
Absent Evidence Of Lack Of Market Power, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, July 28, 1994, at 7.
72. Young Gas Storage Company, Ltd., "Order Issuing Certificates And Granting And Denying Rehearing," 66 F.E.R.C.
61,280 (Mar. 3, 1994). F.E.R.C. Issues Certificate For Young Gas

Storage ProjectIn Colorado; Increases Authorized Equity Return On Rehearing From 12.25 Percent
To 12.75 Percent, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, June 16, 1994, at 23.
73. Growing Role Of Storage Projects And Market Centers Predicted For CaliforniaGas Markets, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, July 28, 1994, at 12.
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tems and serve as a market center for the western regions of the U.S.,
Canada, and Mexico.74
Storage has become a vital part of the gas supply chain. Pipelines',
producers', marketers' and aggregators' portfolios will include a menu of
storage services. Local distribution companies and large industrial customers will buy storage in order to manage their own portfolios of gas
supplies. In the future, storage will be traded electronically and storage
will become part of the futures market.
Pipeline Rate Zones, Cost-BasedRates or Market-Based Rates
A number of pipelines have found that a complex multi-tiered rate
structure hinders the ability to compete at market centers; pipelines are
filing revised tariff sheets to simplify their rate structure. 7" F.E.R.C.'s
Economic Policy Director O'Neill believes that rate zone boundaries will
develop at and around the market centers."
Another issue which has been raised by applications for market hub
rates or storage service rates at F.E.R.C. is whether F.E.R.C. will authorize market-based rates or cost-based rates. Although F.E.R.C. generally
authorizes rates based on the cost of service (cost based rates); F.E.R.C.
"is not required to adhere rigidly to a cost-based determination of rates""n
and has flexibility in selecting a ratemaking methodology. 78 F.E.R.C. may
consider rates reached as a result of competition (market-based rates)
market forces could be relied upon to keep
where it can "demonstrate that
79
prices at reasonable levels."
However, F.E.R.C. has exhibited a reluctance to approve market
based rates for transportation. K N Interstate Gas Transmission Co. applied for market-based rates for its Buffalo Wallow market hub.' If grant74. Alberta Energy Partnership Exploring Kern County, California Gas Storage Project And
Market Center, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Mar. 31, 1994, at 20.

75. For example, NorAm Gas Transmission Company filed tariff sheets to change from its current complexity of postage stamp transportation rates to three additive rate zones on NorAm's
throughway system and to establish a market lateral surcharge designed to recover the costs of such
facilities only from those customers who use them. NorAm Gas Transmission Company, "Order Accepting And Suspending Tariff Sheets Subject To Refund And Conditions, And Establishing A Technical Conference And Hearing Procedures," Docket Nos. RP94-343-000, et al. 68 F.E.R.C.
272 (Aug. 31, 1994).

1 61,

76. O'Neill, supra note 18, at 12. An example of these rate zone boundaries was applied by
National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. at Ellisburg-Leidy.
77. Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 734 F.2d 1486, 1501 (D.C. Cir.

1984) (quoting F.E.R.C. v. Pennzoil Production Company, 439 U.S. 508, 517 (1979)).
78. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790 (1968).
79. Farmers Union, 734 F.2d at 1510.
80. K N Interstate Gas Transmission Co., "Order Rejecting Tariff Sheets And Providing For
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ed by F.E.R.C., this application would have been the first time marketbased rates for transportation services would have been approved. Instead,
F.E.R.C. rejected the proposed market-based transportation tariff sheets
stating that K N had not shown that it lacked significant market power."
When K N Interstate Gas Transmission Co. reapplied for cost-based
transportation rates, F.E.R.C. granted this revised application.82
F.E.R.C. also denied Ouachita River Gas Storage Co.'s request to
provide interruptible hub services at market-based rates, since Ouachita
had not demonstrated a sufficient lack of market power. F.E.R.C. grappled with "how its framework for analysis of market power might apply
to an application for market-based rates for hub services '8 3 and decided
that the company must show that "sufficient good alternatives to its proposed services are available in sufficient quantity to prevent Ouachita
River from exercising market power. " "
F.E.R.C. continues to be uncomfortable with market-based transportation rates; however, F.E.R.C. did ask the industry for comments on
achieving non-traditional, market-based and incentive rates .' It is uncertain, though, what evidence F.E.R.C. will accept as conclusively proving
lack of market power.
In conclusion, the era of pipeline exclusively as transporter has
dawned. And along with this new role has come the creation of market
hubs offering flexible buying and selling, the availability of long term
contracting and hourly trading, uniform electronic markets, futures tradFurther Procedures," Docket No. RP94-328-000, 68 F.E.R.C. 61,401 (Sept. 30, 1994). F.E.R.C.
expressed concern that extensive business arrangements with affiliates and the existence of captive
customers did not lend itself to light-handed regulation. F.E.R.C. stated that K N had not documented
the effect the non jurisdictional services (title transfers, electronic trading) would have on jurisdictional services and that requiring daily balancing and a daily variance charge contradicted the need for
additional flexibility in negotiating terms and conditions with prospective shippers. Id.
81. Id.
82. K N Interstate Gas Transmission Co., Docket Nos. RP95-35-000, et al. "Order Accepting
And Suspending Tariff Sheets, Subject To Refund And Conditions," 69 F.E.R.C. 61, 287 (Dec. 2,
1994).
83. Commission Says No To Market Based Rates For Associated Interruptible Hub Service,
FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Oct. 6, 1994, at 3.
84. Commissioner Santa mused, "What if Ouachita River demonstrated good alternatives for 50 of
the 72 interconnect paths but then offered rate caps or some other means to mitigate its market power with
respect to the interconnect paths for which there was no good alternative?" F.E.R.C. Has Mixed Feelings
About Planned Ouachita River Storage Project, INSIDE F.E.R.C., Oct. 10, 1994, at 15.
85. Alternatives To Traditional Cost-Of-Service Ratemaking For Natural Gas Pipelines, "Request For Comments And Alternative Pricing Methods," Docket No. RM95-6-O0, 70 F.E.R.C.
61,139 (Feb. 8, 1995); "Market-based rates for pipelines may result in a barrage of litigation before
the pipelines finally lose the battle ... market analysis for pipelines would be extremely complex and
costly and would likely result in findings of significant market power for most pipeline markets."
Utilities Warn F.E.R.C. To Go Easy With Market Rates, GAS DAILY, Mar. 1, 1995, at 3.
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ing, and capacity release transactions. Unique pipeline transportation services have appeared.

F.E.R.C.'s vision of replicating wellhead competition and introducing competition into the pipeline segment of the natural gas industry is
complete. But how will the benefits of competition reach the consumer?
Currently small gas producers, many local distribution companies, and

small end users are not directly using market hubs since they lack transportation capacity and do not ship large volumes of gas on hub facilities.s'
Even though F.E.R.C. has no jurisdictional control over local distribution
companies, it is reasonable to assume that the various state commissions

will use F.E.R.C. deregulation of the pipeline industry as a template to
deregulate the gas industry at the local level.
PART 3.

DEREGULATION OF THE LOCAL DISTRIBUTION COMPANY

The deregulation of interstate natural gas pipelines has dramatically
impacted state commissions and the local distribution companies (LDCs)
they regulate."1 Prior to the deregulation of interstate natural gas pipelines, state commissions relied on the F.E.R.C. to review pipeline gas
costs -costs which were then passed through to the LDCs. With the
pipelines now functioning as transporters of gas, LDCs are responsible
for gas supply and must justify gas supply costs to the state commissions.
In turn, the state commissions must determine whether it will review
LDC gas costs or adopt a light handed regulatory approach similar to the
F.E.R.C. and allow market-based gas costs.
In time, LDCs will mimic deregulated pipelines and terminate or se-

verely curtail their historic gas sales service,"8 offering unbundled transportation, storage, capacity release, and administrative and financial services.

86. U.S. Natural Gas Hubs, supra note 21, at 30.
87. "Order No. 636 pulled the bundled merchant service 'safety net" out from under local distribution companies. Now responsibilities are shiding from the pipelines to the LDCs, who must manage their
interstate pipeline capacity and the markets behind their city gates," according to F.E.R.C. Commissioner
Santa. Santa: LDCs Turning LeanerAnd Meaner Under 636, GAS DAILY, Feb. 28, 1995. at 2.
88. Historically, most LDCs offered only three types of service: residential, firm non residential, and interruptible gas sales service. Except during supply shortages in the 1970s, LDCs did not
offer customers the option of transportation, balancing, and storage service for customer-owned gas.
Moreover, rates for firm and interruptible sales service to industrial customers were set above cost of
service, causing industrial customers to subsidize residential service. This was justified on the basis
that industrial customers placed a higher value on the gas. Until recently, this price discrimination between rate classes and bundling of sales with transportation service continued with little complaint
from industrial customers because federal authorities kept LDC wholesale gas costs-the bulk of LDC
total costs-at low levels compared to alternate fuels. Louis Monacell, Unbundling Natural Gas Service: Lessons From Virginia, FORTNIGHTLY, May 11, 1989, at 9 [hereinafter Monacell].
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Repercussions from the deregulation of the pipeline industry have
altered completely the LDC's sales service (residential, firm, firm non
residential and interruptible). Competition is appearing at the local level.
With this competition, the LDC will face more risk, more responsibility
for gas supply, variable costs of gas transportation and storage, threat of
pipeline bypass, and loss of large loads.89 To be successful, the LDC now
must face the challenge of deregulation and expand beyond its historic
sales service role. To be competitive, the LDC must add new services,
marketing affiliates, gas procurement and management, pipeline hubs,
storage projects, capacity release, transportation, curtailment, and pooling
of resources to its current portfolio of services."
Increased Oversight Role of State Commissions
Now that the LDC "can assemble a portfolio of gas supplies, firm
transportation, and storage arrangements which are tailored to their individual needs rather than purchasing a 'one size fits all' bundled service
package from their pipeline supplier, the LDCs [can] reduce their costs by
purchasing only services they need and [so exercise]. . .control over
[their] destiny." 9 ' However, with this increased LDC control comes increased LDC responsibility and risk. Indeed, F.E.R.C.'s lessening of control over pipelines at the federal level has increased regulatory oversight
at the local level. The increased oversight role of the state commissions
began once the pipelines unbundled, with some state commissions angered
by the abdication of F.E.R.C.'s regulatory role and the resulting increased responsibility at the local level.'
89. Competition will jeopardize the industrial load which has historically subsidized the LDC
residential forcing prices to increase dramatically to the residential core customer. Order 636 May
Add 34 Cents Per Mcf To Residential Consumers' Bills from 1993 through 1995 according to the
Energy Information Administration in the recent article in INSIDE F.E.R.C., Feb. 28, 1994, at 13.
90. Stephen Huntoon, 636 to the Burnertip? FORTNIGHTLY, July 1, 1994, at 22 [hereinafter
Huntoon]. These new services are "unbundled"; basically, "the customer is entitled to choose any, all
or none of its gas related services and only pay for those it wants ... an a la carte approach can save
the customer money by allowing him to choose only those services he believes he needs."
Elizabethtown Gas Seeks New Jersey State Board Of Commissioners' Approval Of Additional
Unbundled Services, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Mar. 31, 1994, at 15. Order No. 636, supra
note 9.
91.

PIPELINE INDUSTRY, Jan., 1994, at 13.

92. A number of state commissions and associations have filed a joint brief requesting that the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reverse and remand Order No. 636, et al.
Among other issues, the petitioners state that SFV rate design eliminated pipeline incentives for productive efficiency and attack the position that MFV rate design is unjust and unreasonable; petitioners
contend that F.E.R.C. should have mitigated GSR costs through the abrogation or modification of jurisdictional contracts or disallowance of some portion of gas supply realignment (GSR) cost recovery
from consumers; petitioners also claim that the F.E.R.C. failed to provide a reasoned explanation for
preempting state commission jurisdiction over the assignment by LDCs of their capacity entitlements
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The same issues addressed by F.E.R.C. are now reappearing at the
state level: competition, partial or complete deregulation, market-based
rates, market affiliates, incentive plans, unbundling, and new services.93

Paramount among state commission concerns is the fear that deregulation
will result in poorer services and higher rates for the consumer. 94 In an
attempt to alleviate this concern, state commissions immediately began by
participating in the Order No. 636 proceedings at the F.E.R.C. level "to
try to mitigate cost shifting to core distribution customers." 9'
State Commissions Review Gas PurchasingPractices
State commissions fear that the LDC core customers' will pay the
costs for unbundling. The LDC "will still be the sole supplier for bundled
gas and will continue to be subject to state public utility regulation. The
size of the core market is expected to shrink as Straight Fixed Variable
(SFV) transportation rate and full passthrough of transition costs make
core distribution service more expensive."' Sophisticated noncore customers will leave the LDC, and contract individually for gas supply,
bypass, or use alternate fuels to supplement their gas load. Non-core
customers will use LDC facilities to transport gas only.9"
on interstate pipelines. United Distribution Companies, et al. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Joint Brief For Petitioners: Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, Public Utilities Commission Of The State Of California, Illinois Commerce Commission, State Of Indiana, Office Of Utility
Consumer Counselor, Iowa Utilities Board, Public Service Commission of the Commonwealth Of
Kentucky, Maryland Office Of People's Counsel, Missouri Public Service Commission. New Jersey
Board of Public Utilities, Public Service Commission of the State of New York, Ohio Office Of the
Consumers' Counsel, Pennsylvania Office Of Consumer Advocate, Public Service Commission Of
West Virginia, Consumer Advocate Division, Public Service Commission Of Wisconsin, The National Association Of State Utility Consumer Advocates, And The National Association Of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners; United States Court Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit, Nos.
Mar. 14, 1995 (on file with the Land and Water Law Review).
92-1485, et al.,
93. See supra note 69.
94. State commissions must now embark on a thorough analysis of the need for LDC regulatory reform to allow "more reliable, flexible, efficient and customer service (oriented LDCs)."
NARVC/DOE Gas Panelists Agree That Smooth LDC Operations So Far in1994 Clear Path for State
Regulations to Forge More Flexible Rules, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Feb. 24, 1994, at 16.
[hereinafter Clear Pathfor State Regulations].
95. Id.
96. Typically, the core customer is served under the LDC's firm sales service tariff, is heat
sensitive, uses low volumes of natural gas and has no alternate fuels available - the small residential
customer. In contrast, the non core customer takes sales service under a flexible rate schedule, has installed dual fuel equipment, and takes interruptible or firm transportation service - the small commercial or industrial customer. Typically, the small commercial or industrial customer uses more gas
than the residential customer. If the LDC serves only the core customer, the LDCs' rates will rise
when its customer base shrinks.
97. FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Feb. 24, 1994, at 10.

98. The New York Public Service Commission listed non core customer criteria: service by
contract not tariff, direct customer participation in commodity and capacity markets, alternative fuel
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Prior to deregulation, the LDC purchased both gas supplies and
transportation from the pipeline and paid for the bundled service. Since
the LDC is no longer tied to the pipeline for gas supplies, and may purchase gas from a supplier other than the pipeline, for the first time the
LDC is strictly accountable for their gas purchasing policies. Not only is
the LDC responsible for choosing their suppliers and for portfolio diversification, they are now answerable to the state commissions for a hindsight
review of these decisions. "[C]oncepts of reliability and portfolio diversification and how a portfolio lowers risks in a quantitative manner are simple, technical problems. .

.

. Without a way to quantify reliability, there

can be no rational basis to agree on the 'prudency' of paying for reliability. " 99 Without the F.E.R.C. purchase gas adjustment (PGA) approval
process," ° state commissions question their ability to review utility filings. The LDC must convince the state commissions that its gas supply
choices were the most prudent choices it could make.1"' State commis-

capability and minimum volume (5,000 dth) or minimum purchase conditions ($10,000 annually.)
New York Public Service Commission Will Evaluate Report Of Staff On Competitive Market Options
For The State's Natural Gas Utilities, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, May 26, 1994, at 9.
99. Id.
100. Prior to the issuance of Order No. 636, pipeline companies sold natural gas and transported it to their customers for a bundled rate. The cost of gas often was the largest percentage and the
most volatile cost of the bundled rate. Purchased gas adjustment (PGA) filings were made at the
F.E.R.C. stating the volumes purchased and the price. After review, the F.E.R.C. accepted these
costs as prudent. Once approved at the federal level, natural gas companies could then 'pass through'
these gas purchase costs to their customers. When Order No. 636 mandated that pipeline companies
separate their sales service from their transportation service, F.E.R.C. discontinued its review of
PGA filings. The obligation to determine the prudence of purchased gas costs shifted to the state
commissions.
101. Many state commissions, including Colorado, are reconsidering the gas cost adjustment
(GCA) or purchase gas adjustment (PGA) filings to determine if (1) the GCA/PGA is still necessary;
(2) if the GCA/PGA cost components are accurate and the costs should be passed through to the consumers; and (3) if the level of review at the state commission is sufficient now that F.E.R.C. is no
longer scrutinizing purchase gas costs at the federal level. "In The Investigation Of Gas Cost And
Purchased Gas Adjustment Clauses For Regulated Gas Utilities," Colorado Public Utilities Commission, Docket No. 931-701G, Dec. 9, 1993.
The Colorado Public Utilities Commission refused to eliminate the current GCA/PGA filings
but instead scheduled informal conferences to "develop modifications to the GCA filing and review
procedures" which will assist the commission in its new oversight role of substantively reviewing
these filings. "Commission Order Closing Investigation And Ordering The Development Of Modifications To The Gas Cost Adjustment And Purchase Gas Adjustment Filing And Review Process," Colorado Public Utilities Commission, Docket No. 931-701G, Apr. 12, 1995.
The New Jersey state commission considered whether "review of specific purchased gas
costs [should] be abandoned in favor of benchmark regulation, such as performance based regulation." Commissioner Donald Santa Raises Natural Gas Issues Facing State Regulators In Keynote Address To New Jersey Gas Summit Conference, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, July 21, 1994, at 4.

At least one state commission (New York Public Service Commission) is reviewing three different approaches for reviewing LDC gas purchasing practices: "pre-approvals, contemporaneous indexing,
and post hoc prudence assessments." New York Public Service Commission Will Evaluate Report Of
Staff On Competitive Market Options For The State's Natural Gas Utilities, FOSTER NATURAL GAS
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sions "retain the essential task of making sure that the obligation to serve
does not get lost in the pushing and shoving of competition.""t 0
Of fundamental concern to all LDCs is the issue of state commissions actively participating in both a pre-review and a post-review of
LDC gas supply decisions. Seeking security in this volatile gas market,
LDCs support the prior approval of supply and capacity portfolios.
F.E.R.C. Commissioner Jim Hoecker agrees. Prudence review standards
and procedures "have historically held gas management to a standard of
care, if not 'clairvoyance,' that will foil peak market responses in the
future. Distributors should no longer be held exclusively to long term
firm supply commitments and the premium those arrangements entail." 3
Integrated Resource Planning
Many state commissions are demanding Integrated Resource Planning (IRP). Long range least cost demand side management (DSM) and
supply side forecast planning are an attempt to assert a "pre-review" of
gas costs and gas supply expenditures." Utilities are hopeful that a "prereview" or "pre-approval" of gas costs and gas supply expenditures will

decrease the need for audits or hearings. To date, LDCs have filed DSM
programs in at least sixteen states with IRP dockets opened in at least
eleven states.t10

However, state commissions have rejected generic natural gas DSM
and IRP standards in various states because (1) the review of purchased
gas adjustment filings accomplishes the same thing as IRP, (2) competition makes IRP incentives less necessary to ensure lower gas prices,"
REPORT, May 26, 1994, at 20. Without question, pre-approval of the contract portfolio would give
the utility a sense of security by "publicly and procedurally committing the commission." Adam Jaffe
and Joseph Kalt, Insight On Oversight, FORTNIGTLy, Apr. 15, 1994, at 24-25.
102. See Clear Pathfor State Regulations, supra note 94, at 4.
103. Commissioner Hoecker Outlines State And Federal Roles In Coming To Terms With New Economic Crcumstances Of Natural Gas Indtistry, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, June 16, 1994, at 4.
104. Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) relies on long range least cost demand side management (DSM) and supply side forecast planning to conserve energy and lower energy consumption.
105. Third Survey of State Developments Shows More Utility Commissions Support Rate and
Business Incentivesfor LDCs, FOsTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Oct. 27, 1995, at 11 [herinafter Third
Survey].
106. The Colorado Public Utility Commission ended its IRP docket for natural gas utilities
when it concluded that generic IRP gas standards were generally opposed. Three reasons were listed
by the Commission: (1) natural gas production is a competitive industry; (2) there was no substantial
evidence that there is cost effective demand-side management measures for natural gas; (3) there are
pending dockets which allow parties to raise issues relating to the prudency of utility purchases of natural gas and the utilities' incentives to purchase the least cost natural gas. "Re: Investigation Into The
Development Of The Gas Rules Concerning Integrated Resource Planning," Colorado Public Utilities
Commission, Docket No. 92R-287G, May 26, 1994. The IRP issues, in particular supply side man-
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and/or (3) the regulatory process may not be an appropriate public intervention vehicle or an effective policy instrument for achieving IRP objectives. 1°7 Some state commissions have reviewed gas IRP options and have
concluded:
[T]hat the need exists for pro-competitive, incentive based
policies in the gas sector and that an IRP process should focus
more attention on the supply side of LDC operations ....
[Furthermore,] PUCs [Public Utility Commissions] should consider moving toward less regulation to facilitate the movement
toward greater competition in the energy industry . . .. A
participatory or interventionist IRP process can either impede
competition, especially when customer choices are obstructed,
or be ineffective or redundant when customers have options to

override the intended purposes.' 08
Thus, the IRP process is no longer seen as the panacea for all natural gas
supply concerns.
Incentives
State commissions must consider rate incentives for unbundled
LDCs, especially for those LDCs which continue to provide gas sales service to their core customers. Tailoring incentive plans on an individual
basis will meet the unique concerns of each LDC. LDCs should actively
lobby against state commission attempts to create "generic" incentive
plans.

Incentive plans vary from state commission to state commission: retention of a percentage of net revenues, performance based regulation,
revenue caps, discounts, and cash incentives."

agement, will be reviewed in the Colorado PUC investigation of gas costs and purchased gas adjustment clauses. See supra note 101.
107. Not all state commissions are enamored with the IRP process. In an article entitled A Real
Loser, Illinois Commissioner Ruth Kretschmer states "the reality is that gas IRP is not cost-effective.
In fact, it's a clear loser." Ruth Kretschmer and Larry Mraz, FORTNIGHTLY, Mar. 1, 1994, at 17.
Third Survey, supra note 105, at 11.
108. Id. at 10-11.
109. The New York Public Service Commission is considering whether it should allow the LDC
to retain 15% of the net revenues or credits from capacity release and other pipeline services, with
85% passed along to its customers. New York Public Service Commission Will Evaluate Report Of
Staff On Competitive Market Options For The State's Natural Gas Utilities, FOSTER NATURAL GAS
REPORT, May 26, 1994, at 9 [hereinafter New York Public Service Commission].
Massachusetts De'partment of Public Utilities issued a generic notice of inquiry and order requesting comments on incentive regulation for natural gas companies to consider performance based
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Local DistributionCompany (LDC)Marketing Affiliates
Another issue which the state regulators must consider is how to deal
with LDC market affiliates."' Many LDCs will contemplate the formation of
an unregulated market affiliate to compete with aggregators and producers.
Questions similar to those F.E.R.C. grappled with will arise at the state
commission level: Should states adopt an Order No. 497 marketing affiliatetype rule? Is there a potential for cross subsidies? Should core customers bear
the risk of the marketing affiliate's offsystem activities if they don't share in
the commensurate benefits where the affiliate is profitable? Is there discrimination or favoritism in the LDC's treatment of the marketing affiliate?,"
regulatory processes. Third Survey, supra note 105, at 5. The Commission posits that "incentive
regulation ties a utility's level of cost recovery to a predetermined performance indicator or mix of
indicators, or to external indices such as a price level or expected productivity levels. It also recognizes the legitimacy of profit as an important motivator for utilities as long as customers benefit beyond
levels likely under current regulation . . . three general approaches to incentive regulation: (1) use of
a broad-based or narrowly-targeted incentives, (2) price caps, and (3) rate of return bandwidth." Id.
The California Public Utilities Commission has approved a tailor made base rate incentive
plan for San Diego Gas & Electric Co.; this plan includes (1) a five year review cycle, (2) a cap on
revenues subject to changes in inflation, customer growth and productivity, (3) regressive revenue
sharing, and (4) performance incentives.
The Georgia Public Service Commission is reviewing plans to promote new business for utilities, including discounts and cash incentives for targeted businesses. For example, "United Cities
Gas Co., is currently operating an incentive plan that is applied to new customers that bring an annual
load of at least 27,000 Mcf and to existing customers that raise their load by 13,500 Mcf. A 40%
discount on marginal cost is attributed to the eligible customer in the first year, 30% in the second
year, 20% in the third year, and 10% in the fourth year." Id. at 9.
However, at least one state commission (Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control)
concluded that it was premature to implement a gas cost incentive mechanism. Indeed, the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control required utilities to submit a load duration curve, a load
factor calculation and a capacity utilization factor for the twelve month period as part of the annual
PGA deferred gas cost filing; this additional information might be used as performance standards for
future incentive type gas supply cost mechanisms. Connecticut Regulatory Commission Issues Decision On LDC Issues Stemming From Order No. 636; Determines Need For Unbundling Of LDC Services And PrescribesMechanisms For Recovery Of Transition Costs, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT,
July 28, 1994, at 13.
110. F.E.R.C. Order No. 497 defined an affiliate as "another person which controls, is
controlled by, or is under common control with, such person" and defines marketing as "a sale
of natural gas to any person or entity by a seller that is not an interstate pipeline. 18 CFR
§161.1 Inquiry Into Alleged Anticompetitive Practices Related To Marketing Affiliates of Interstate Pipelines, Order No. 497, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,139 (June 14, 1988), F.E.R.C. Stat. and
Regs., Regulations Preambles 1986-1990,
30,820 (1988), order on rehearing, Order No. 497A, 54 Fed. Reg. 52,781 (Dec. 22, 1989), F.E.R.C. Stat. and Regs., Regulations Preamble
1986-1990, 9 30,868 (1989), order extending sunset date, Order No. 497-B, 55 Fed. Reg.
53,291 (Dec. 28, 1990), F.E.R.C. Stat. and Regs., Regulations Preambles 1986-1990, 30,908
(1990), order extending sunset date and amending final rule, Order No. 497-C, 57 Fed. Reg. 9
30,934 (1992), reh'g denied, 57 Fed. Reg. 5,815,
(Jan. 2, 1992), F.E.R.C. Stat. and Regs.
58 F.E.R.C.
61,139 (1992) aff'd in part and remanded in part, Tenneco Gas v. F.E.R.C.,
969 F.2d 1187 (D.C. 1992), order on remand and extending sunset date, Order No. 497-D, 57
Fed. Reg. 58,978, F.E.R.C. Stats. and Regs. 1 30,958 (1992).
111. CommissionerDonald Santa Raises Natural Gas Issues Facing State Regulators In Keynote
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One area in which market affiliate issues arise is in offering
rebundled sales service (gas supply plus transportation) to customers. Eligibility to market gas through unregulated affiliates in their own service
territories raises state commission concerns. Worried about possible
abuse, some commissions restrict the LDCs by disallowing the use of
market affiliates in the parent's service territories. 112
With no expection that F.E.R.C. will repeal Order No. 497, state
commissions will be tempted to use the F.E.R.C. order as a template
for state regulation. This type of regulatory oversight at the state level
will inhibit competition. State commissions must be encouraged to use
a complaint procedure-if a complaint is lodged by a third party, the
state commission will
investigate and, if necessary, resolve market
3
affiliate concerns.
Unbundling at the State Level
Smaller local distribution company customers behind the city gate
are the only major segment of the natural gas industry left to deregulate fully." 4 The pressure to unbundle at the local level will be insurmountable for the LDCs and for the state commissions. Indeed, the
question is5 no longer "if" unbundling will occur at the LDC level, but
"when."" Many unbundling enthusiasts believe that the "unbundling

Address To New Jersey Gas Summit Conference, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, July 21, 1994, at 4
[hereinafter Commissioner Don Santa].
112. New York Public Service Commission, supra note 109, at 20.
113. The Wyoming Public Service Commission has its complaint procedure set out in Section
114. Complaints. of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. Section 114 (a) states that
"Any person, municipality, public utility or the Attorney General may file a complaint regarding any
matter under the Commission's jurisdiction." Section 114 outlines the steps to take for both formal
and informal complaints. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Reg. § 114 (1994).
114. David Pruner, U.S. Gas Market Adapting To Commoditization;Electricity Likely To Follow
Similar Course, OIL & GAS JOURNAL, Mar. 13, 1995, at 66 [hereinafter Pruner].
115. Pennsylvania regulators are urged to "permit gas utilities to depart from their merchant
role and give customers more competitive gas purchase choices based on market-driven prices and
services." Panel Votes To Bring 636 To State Level, GAS DAILY, May 4,1994, at 5."The New York
State Public Service Commission will ... hear opinions on taking Order 636 to a state level." N.Y.
Commission To HearIdeas On Unbundling, GAS DAILY, June 8, 1994, at 4. Staff at the Ohio Public
Utilities Commission concluded, "the intrastate natural gas industry can no longer operate in a paternalistic manner whereby regulatory edict decides which uses and which consumers of gas are entitled
to preferential treatment under varying circumstances and conditions. The LDCs, while retaining upstream capacity and commodity planning and acquisition responsibility for a yet to be fully defined
captive or core class of consumers, can no longer conduct operations in the black box fashion of a
previous era ....Staff recommended that it relieve LDCs of a firm obligation to provide commodity
in the event of a failure in the transportation of gas supply and adopt ...

a best efforts only obliga-

tion." Survey Of States Uncovers No Radical Effort To Reform LDC Regulations This Winter. But
Ideas For Local Responses To F.E.R. C. 's Restructuring Of Natural Gas Pipelines Are Being Ex-
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of services, each priced at the cost of service, best achieves the goals
of promoting financially strong utilities, fair rates to all classes of customers, efficient utility management, and the filtering down of benefits
of upstream competition."" 6
Unbundling at the local distribution company level will begin with
open access transportation and continue with the unbundling of LDC storage with storage capacity held by industrials or an aggregator." 7 In addition to firm and interruptible transportation and storage service, LDCs
will offer released firm transportation, various seasonal peak and off-peak
services and emergency transportation."'
LDC open access transportation allows third party shippers to
move gas on the LDC distribution transportation system." 9 New Mexico was the first state commission to encourage open access transportation, followed closely by Colorado."2 Basically, the LDC open access
transportation tariffs on file with the state commissions mirror the
pipeline-filed F.E.R.C. open access transportation tariffs, promising
nondiscriminatory transportation of third party gas at a set transportation rate. Since gas aggregators and marketers have the most to benefit
from open access transportation at the local level, it is not surprising
that gas aggregators or marketers are confirmed proponents of gas

plored, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Feb. 10, 1994, at 8 [hereinafter Survey Of States]. Wisconsin Public Service Commission is leaning toward "let[ting] the free market decide," and therefore
taking steps "to expand operations beyond their franchise territories and are competing for outside
industrial customers." Id. at 16; Election Forces States To Quicken Unbundling Pace, GAS DAILY,
Feb. 14, 1995, at 1.
116. "Unbundling of services at cost-based rates offers the prospect of achieving to a greater
degree the policy objectives of regulation. All classes of customers would be treated fairly by being
charged rates based on cost of service. If a wide menu of unbundled services is offered, customers
would be able to determine what types and levels of service they want. Most importantly, unbundling
allows alternate-fuel and gas-on-gas competition to put pressure on LDCs to reduce their costs and
rates for all customers and to be innovative in their development of new types of services and in their
gas supply acquisition strategies." Monacell, supra note 88, at 15.
117. Unbundling At LDC Level Will Feature New Set Of Problems, NARUC Told, INSIDE
F.E.R.C., Aug. 3,1992, at 13.
118. Id.
119. In fact, transportation by the LDCs has increased dramatically according to the American
Gas Association (AGA); "A large percentage of the medium to large LDCs currently offers some
type of transportation service . . . . The percentage of volumes delivered to commercial, industrial
and electric utility customers as transportation climbed steadily from 42.7% in 1988 to 46.6% in
1989, 50.6% in 1990, 53.7% in 1991 and 56% in 1992. AGA Finds LDC Transportation On Upswing, Firm Supply Predominating, INSIDE F.E.R.C., Oct. 31, 1994, at 19. AGA figures for 1993
continue to show increased transportation by the LDCs.
120. Open Access Transportation, NMPUC Rule 660; Open Access Transportation, Colo. PUC
4 CCR 723-1; Pennsylvania PUC Adopts Guidelines For Treatment Of Order 636 Transition Costs
Flowed To LDCs And Proceeds With Development Of IntrastateNatural Gas TransportationRules In
Post-636 Era, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Nov. 4, 1993, at 14.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1996

27

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 31 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 2
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXI

utility unbundling and service options to small commercial, industrial
end users and groups of residential end users.' 2'
Unbundling And Rebundling The Core/Non-Core Customers
The most difficult problem faced by the LDCs and state commissions is the LDCs' continuing obligation to serve its customers. t '2 Conservative analysts encourage the unbundling of LDC services for non-core
customers to allow non-core customers the economic benefits of market
priced competition.'2 They conclude that unbundled services should be
offered to non-core customers, with individual circumstances determining
whether such services are offered at cost or at market prices. If services
to the non-core customers are unbundled, ideally no state regulatory
oversight of gas purchases would exist, as the competitively priced market
will replace state regulation.
However, regulatory oversight of gas purchases made for core customers remains essential and indeed, "must necessarily increase in
scope."" LDCs are burdened with the duty to serve the core market.
We will never achieve a level playing field contested by like players if one of the players has to bear a load which the others shun:
the core ....The issue... is severely complicated by the cumber-

some burden of the market participant with core responsibilities
and the social interest in the survival of that entity. . . .[Piroper.
. regulation turns on recognition that the marketplace has... [distinguished] between. . . [the core and non-core markets]. . . ."

Former F.E.R.C. Commissioner Charles Stalon challenges this position. He advocates that "state regulators. . .rethink an LDC's obligation
to serve." This obligation "needs to be modified dramatically, with an eye
toward eliminating it after the new industry structure is seasoned." 216 But
121.

State Commissions Tiptoe Toward Gas Utility Market Innovations, FOSTER NATURAL GAS

REPORT, July 7, 1994, at 10 [hereinafter State Commissions Tiptoe].
obligation to serve cus122. Marketers or aggregators do not have the public utility's statutory
tomers. Marketers or aggregators have a contractual arrangement with their customers.
123. FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Feb. 10, 1994,.at 11; FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Feb.
24, 1994 at 16; FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Mar. 3, 1994, at 31.
124. New York Public Service Commission, supra note 109, at 20; Regulators See Need For
Utilities To Continue Bundled Service Option, GAS UTILITY REPORT, Feb. 17, 1995, at 1.
125. Gas Utility Incentive Rate Mechanisms In Califomia Differentiate Core And Non-Core Customer
Mix, Fessler Tells NARUCIDOE Conference, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Feb. 17, 1994, at 3.
126. In The Post-Order 636 Industry, LDCs Should Concentrate, INSIDE F.E.R.C., Feb. 14,
1994, at 6 (quoting Farmer Commissioner Charles Stalon in N.Y. Public Service Commission proceeding (No. 93-G-0932)).
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it is not simply a matter of removing the LDC obligation to serve. 2 7 Current F.E.R.C. Commissioner Donald Santa raises an additional issue: "If
an LDC decides to exit the gas merchant business. . .would state regulators release the LDC from its obligation to be the supplier of last resort
and, if so, then who will be?"'"
Every state commission will eventually deal with the issue of
unbundling as LDCs will watch their competitors and imitate them. State
commissions will be presented with unbundling issues whether they have
initiated proceedings of their own and may emulate resolutions adopted by
129
other state commissions or F.E.R.C.
Not wishing to be limited to the unbundled options, some LDCs prefer the rebundled option - optional merchant-bundled services. Swimming against the unbundling tide, two LDCs have "asked for complete
pricing flexibility in the large volume market" by proposing programs
which would "wrap together released capacity with gas supply to serve
larger end users." 3 0 The LDC, acting as agent for optional merchant bundled services, would combine a capacity release and a pooling program,
purchase gas, and arrange for transportation to the burner tip, so-called
"one stop shopping."' The LDC would buy competitively priced gas for
both the pool and its own system supply requirements, with the lowest
cost gas going to system supply needs and the higher priced supplies to
the pool. 3 2 At the same time, it would acquire firm capacity on upstream
pipelines that either the LDC or another party is releasing.' 33 Then the

127. Stalon also questions whether "LDC ha[s] a continuing obligation to provide sales service
to a customer that wants only transportation service; or what will be the response to pressures to mandate that LDCs offer transportation on terms comparable to that embedded in retail sales service; and
what will be the response when an LDC seeks to recover transition costs, or stranded costs, associated with gas supply that were intended for a customer that no longer wants to purchase from the distributer?" FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Mar. 3, 1994, at 31.
128. Commissioner Donald Santa, supra note I 11, at 4.

129. NARUC's Winter Meeting Held In Washington, D.C. Features F.E.R.C. Commissioner
Don Santa And Others Reporting On Initiatives To Facilitate The States' Grasp Of Expanding Competitiveness Of Retail Natural Gas Market, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, Mar. 3, 1994, at 31.
130. New York LDCs Propose Bundling Released Capacity With Gas Supply, INSIDE F.E.R.C., July

5, 1993, at 3. Some LDCs want to offer bundled services to those customers not interested in customized
service. Maryland Moves Foravrd On LDC Unbundling, GAS DAILY, Feb. 16, 1995, at 1.

131. Several companies have expanded this concept to include "one stop energy shopping" by
adding oil and liquids marketing and the marketing of electric power. CNG Executive Has Big Plans

For 'One Stop (Energy) Shop,' ENERGY DAILY, Jan. 20, 1995, at 1; Transco EstablishesPower Marketing Unit; Initial OperationsIn Eastern U.S., INDEPENDENT POWER REPORT, Dec. 30, 1994, at 8;
Petroleum Marketer Forms Power Marketing Division For California,INDEPENDENT POWER REPORT,
Sept. 23, 1994, at 6.

132. Id. See Petroleum Marketer Forms Power Marketing Division for California, INDEPENDENT POWER REPORT, Sept. 23, 1994, at 6.

133. id. See Transco Establishes Power Marketing Unit; Initial Operations in Eastern U.S.,
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LDC could schedule the gas to its city gate and if requested by the pool
customer, to the burner tip. As agent it would receive all bills for gas
supply and released capacity and would send the pool customer a single
bill for the whole service.'
Streaming is a form of rebundling which allows the LDC to dedicate
specific gas supplies to certain customers or markets. Many LDCs claim
that "streaming is necessary to participate effectively in competitive markets. However, core customers must be assured of no adverse impact,
must be shown to be better off, and must be protected from undue discrimination. "135
The issue of unbundling at the local distribution company level is
currently before the Wyoming Public Service Commission in an application filed by K N Energy, Inc. to set up a "pilot program to allow choice
between gas suppliers." 36 Dr. Curtis Cramer, an economics professor at
the University of Wyoming, supports retail natural gas competition but
stated that while "deregulation could reduce costs to consumers, there is
also a risk that the PSC would simply be inviting competitors to come
into the local distributing companies' existing markets and take the best
customers. "137
New Services
In order to be competitive, the LDCs must rethink the services they
historically offered (residential, firm non-residential, and interruptible gas
sales service) and consider offering new, additional unbundled services.

INDEPENDENT POWER REPORT, Dec. 30, 1994, at 8.

134. Id. at 4. See supra note 132.
135.

New York Public Service Commission Will Evaluate Report Of Staff On Competitive Market

Options For The State's Natural Gas Utilities, FOSTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, May 26, 1994, at 19.
136. K N Energy, Inc. "In The Matter Of The Application Of K N Energy, Inc. For Authority
To Initiate A Choice Gas Service Program Whereby Customers Can Choose Among Competing Gas
Suppliers In A Competitive Market Place And to Make Certain Related Changes In K N's Tariff,"
Docket No. 30004-GT-95-37, Sept. 8, 1995. The application is summarized as follows:
This Application seeks to initiate a program for unbundling K N's natural gas supply services at the retail level in order to allow customers the opportunity to select among competing gas suppliers. The sale of natural gas supplies as a commodity would be unbundled
from K N's transportation and delivery services in a way that would make it economical
and easy for small customers to participate. K N further proposes to make changes to its
existing transportation tariff and to provide a more equitable method for the recovery of
transition costs associated with moving from a regulated environment to a competitive
marketplace.
Id. Hearings on the pilot program will be held before the Wyoming Public Service Commission in
January with a Commission decision possible by April 1996. Natural Gas DeregulationPoses Opportunities, Risks, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, Sept. 13, 1995, at BI [hereinafter NaturalGas Deregulation].
137. Natural Gas Deregulation, supra note 136.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol31/iss1/2

30

Pendley: Deregulation of the Energy Industry
1996

DEREGULATION OF THE ENERGY INDUSTRY

Regulators are actively encouraging LDCs to offer new services. For example, the New Jersey Board of Regulatory Commissioners' guidelines
required LDCs (1) to eliminate any minimum volume restrictions, (2) to

remove alternative fuel requirements, (3) to allow the aggregation of
small customer transportation availability, (4) to offer storage balancing
and standby services, and (5) to offer a mechanism for notifying in-state
customers of available interstate capacity."' In response to these guidelines, LDCs filed new natural gas transportation service options, without
size limits or alternative fuel requirements. 39 Since New Jersey Natural
Gas Co. won commission approval to unbundle transportation services
from sales, it has implemented a menu of services including firm transportation, interruptible transportation, supply aggregation, storage and
balancing, and interruptible sales. It removed any minimum volume restrictions, and alternate fuel requirements, and it was permitted to aggregate when feasible to make small customer transportation available.
Threatened by the loss of its historic customer base, and pressed

to compete with aggregators and marketers, many LDCs will (in addition to their sales service) offer additional services to attract and/or
keep customers. 14

138. Third Survey, supra note 105, at 10.
139. Id.
140. These additional services may include the following:
Market-basedpricing of LDC balancing services for transportation customers. The balancing
charges will be capped at the utility's undiscounted fully embedded cost until questions about market
power are answered. State Commissions Tiptoe, supra note 121, at 10.
Flexible contract rates for gas;
Gas marketing programs for excess capacity in nonpeak periods;
Aggregation and Pooling-One modified natural gas supply pool tariff for onsystem transportation customers aggregates on behalf of qualified customers commingled gas supplies, from each
interstate pipeline, that may be purchased either on a short term or long term basis. The supplies may
be coupled with interruptible transportation service or firm transportation service secured through capacity release for delivery to the city gate. Pool customers are free to purchase from the pool or from
other marketers/brokers depending on which option is the least cost supply alternative. One unique
element of the proposed service is an "un-firm quoted price and customer nomination procedure provided through an 800 toll free telephone number ... the actual price will be slightly higher or lower
than the requested price but the change will not be significant." Id. at 14.
Negotiated gas sales program;
Offpeakfirm service for sales and transportation;
Firm transportationprogram that includes an initial allotment of 40 MMcf/d of capacity for
delivery of gas purchased by small commercial and industrial customers from third party suppliers.
Participating suppliers are required to accept, under prearranged capacity releases at maximum rates,
a portion of the LDC's firm transportation capacity in interstate pipelines that is equivalent to their
customers' peak day use. Id.
Prearrangedtransportationand storage capacity releases provided that the designated replacement shipper matches the highest bid in the interstate pipeline's bidding process. Order 636
Implementation End-Users ConcernsAbout Problems That DirectAssignment, INSIDE F.E.R.C., Mar.
7, 1994, at 16.
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It is no longer appropriate to ask the question, "Will local distribution companies deregulate?" Now the question is, "When?" Local distribution companies will grapple with the issues which plagued pipelines
(unbundling, competition, market-based rates, market affiliates, open access transportation) and struggle with their position of gas supply provider
of last resort. Faced with these deregulation issues, state commissions
must decide whether to retain broad authority over the retail services by
forcing the LDC to remain as principal aggregator and merchant or give
up that authority to the unregulated market.' 4 ' State commissions will be
tempted to adapt F.E.R.C. resolutions to these issues. 42 Deregulation at
the local level will accomplish the goal of competition from wellhead to
burner tip by bringing the low-priced well head gas to the consumer. 43 It
will also increase state commission regulation over LDC activity. The
LDC's work is before them-they must convince state commissions that
market-based regulation, not increased state commission regulation is the
best way to accomplish F.E.R.C.'s goal.
The CanadianExperience
Many of these issues were raised and resolved almost ten years ago
in Canada. The "Halloween Agreement" deregulated the Canadian natural
gas industry by lifting the controls on natural gas commodity prices, allowing market forces to determine prices, and removing barriers between
willing buyers and sellers.'" This agreement forced TransCanada Pipe
Line to eliminate its merchant function, unbundling its services in 1987.
Eastern Canadian LDCs entered into pure transportation contracts with
Capacityrelease along F.E.R.C. Order No. 636 pipeline capacity release-release on a firm,
offpeak firm, or recallable basis, and the term of each release would be set based on the utility's
determination of the period over which the capacity will not be needed for other services.
Capacity release option of direct capacity assignment to LDCs' customers without going
through the F.E.R.C. Order No. 636 bidding process.
Hedging, futures and swaps-In order to remain competitive, LDCs must utilize "financial
instruments such as futures, options and swaps to provide ...supply security to its customers." Id. at
13. Most state commissions do not have specific rules prohibiting the hedging of gas supply or recovery of hedging costs. While it appears that most LDCs have not realized the economic benefit afforded them by engaging in futures, options. swaps and hedging, it is apparent that these financial tools
will have to be added to the LDC's portfolio of services.
Electronic Data Services-use of the EBB to locate space on interstate pipelines and real
time measurement to allow the sale/transport of gas for shorter periods.
141. Huntoon, supra note 90, at 25.
142.

See Parts 1 and 2 of this article for a discussion of the F.E.R.C. directed resolutions to

these deregulation issues.
143. Practically speaking, competition from wellhead to burnertip is competition from the point
of production to the point of consumption.
144. Agreement Among The Governments Of Canada, Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan on Natural Gas Markets And Prices, October 31, 1985.
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TransCanada Pipe Line. The National Energy Board ordered "operating
demand" capacity release to provide direct access for end users to supply
in Western Canada. 45 Gas deregulation was implemented during a period
of supply surplus. The new regulatory framework facilitated competition
between end users' direct purchase and LDC system supply. This encouraged competition, and gas-on-gas competition was vigorous. The LDCs'
traditional long term supply could not compete with short term direct purchase supply. "6
Similar to our experience, Canadian agents, brokers, and marketers
were new players in the deregulated gas market-players who were dealing
directly with the LDCs' customers. 47 The new players had market
knowledge and access to information and communication technology; they
offered new services-storage, load balancing, information and control systems, financial risk management. 4 ' Canadian LDCs were concerned that the
new players would capture other segments of their business-billing, customer service, and appliance rental. Finally, Canadian LDCs concluded that
direct purchase did not threatbn their business so long as this supply security
was not compromised. 49 At that point, many Canadian LDCs embraced the
new players by forming broker/aggregator subsidiaries. Instead of competing
with the new players, they recognized new business opportunities.
145. Id.
146. In 1985, Canadian LDC system supply equaled 100% of the volumes distributed; in 1995,
Canadian LDC system supply equaled 40% of the volumes distributed. Interview with Jim Hamilton,
Director of Policy Development Marketing, Consumer Gas Co. (Mar. 8, 1995).
147. In Ontario, there are two direct purchase options through which customers purchase pipeline capacity and obtain gas from nonutility suppliers: 1) the transmission option is used by large volume industrial customers who purchase their own pipeline capacity and manage their own gas supply;
and 2) buy/sell option is used by all customer classes (approximately 250,000 residential customers).
The buy/sell option works in the following manner:
A customer enters into a contract with a producer or an intermediary (broker or marketer)
who agrees to supply gas to the utility at a specified delivery point as agent of the customer. Once the agency agreement is in place, the LDC is required to purchase the gas supply
at a predetermined buy/sell reference price which is set by the Ontario Energy Board based
on the utility's weighted average cost of gas less any relevant transportation and administrative charges. At the burner tip, the retail customer is charged the same bundled retail
rate as the sales or system customer. [T]he distribution service provided by the utility is
the same for all customers. A buy/sell customer, however, benefits when its agent is able
to purchase alternate gas supplies at a lower cost than the utility's buy/sell reference price.
The net gain is shared between agent and direct customer pursuant to terms of the agency
contract."
Ontario's Direct Gas Purchase Program Includes Substantial Residential Customer Base, FOSTER
NATURAL GAS REPORT, Feb. 23, 1995, at 11.
148. Id.
149. There were two direct purchase customers in 1986; this number increased to two hundred
twenty-five thousand in 1995. Of that number, approximately 190,000 are residential customers.
Speech Notes, Jim Hamilton, Director, Policy Development Marketing, Consumers' Gas Company
(hereinafter Speech Notes).
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The Canadian LDCs also faced the issue of their obligation to supply
gas to end users. Even though Canadian LDCs do not have a statutory
obligation to serve,15 0 most acknowledged a "political" obligation to
serve: public policy considerations dictate supplying residential customers
and LDCs could not selectively shut off customers.' 5'
The typical Canadian LDCs' 1995 gas portfolio bears no resemblance to their portfolio prior to deregulation. Facing down the major
deregulation issues, the Canadian LDCs have redefined the scope of their
business and their risk. Their concern with the regulatory treatment of gas
costs-gas price volatility, management, prudency review, and indexed
a more competitive
supply contracts-has been met by the knowledge 5that
2
market place requires less regulatory intervention.
In conclusion, the Canadian natural gas deregulation experience illustrates the path that LDCs may take with the deregulation of natural gas pipelines in the United States. A review of the Canadian experience will teach us
that LDCs can benefit by embracing their competitors, by increasing their
transportation load and by charging market-based rates. To accomplish these
positive goals, state commissions must give LDCs the appropriate business
tools to compete in the unregulated market place: unbundled and discounted
transportation rates, assignment of excess capacity and the end of subsidization of residential customers,' or incentive rates if the LDCs continue to
serve core residential customers. Just as deregulation has shifted the responsibility from interstate pipelines to the LDCs, so has the responsibility for
regulatory review shifted from the F.E.R.C. to the state commissions.
PART

4.

DEREGULATION OF THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY

The electric industry is one of the last major industries in the United
States to be deregulated, following the telephone, airlines, and natural gas
industries. With assets of $185 billion, it is more than twice as large as
3000 utility companies. (There are
the natural gas industry, encompassing
4
only 300 natural gas LDCs!)11
150. Public Utilities Act, R.S.O. ch. P. 52, § (1990) (Can.).
151. Speech Notes, supra note 149.
152. Speech Notes, supra note 149. Consumers' Gas Company, Canada's oldest and largest
LDC, has adopted the following philosophy: (1) We make money by distributing gas, not buying and
selling gas; (2) We should not be perceived as a barrier between the customer and cheaper gas; (3)
We will acquire a portfolio of least cost gas at moderate risk for customers favoring LDC gas supply;
(4) We will facilitate access by any customer to alternate supplies provided that the supply security is
not threatened and no subsidy from system supply customers is required.
153.

Mary O'Driscoll, Utility Regulators Must Cut LDC Shackles, Says Hare, ENERGY DAILY,

Feb. 7, 1992, at 3.
154. David Pruner, U.S. Gas Market Adapting To Conmoditization;Electricity Likely To Follow
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Spurred on by its experience of deregulating the natural gas industry
and by the electric power shortages during the winter of 1993-1994,' 1 6
F.E.R.C. has begun the restructuring of the electric power industry. 1
Electric utility executives wonder if the deregulation of the electric industry will follow the pattern established by the F.E.R.C. for the deregulation of the natural gas industry." F.E.R.C.'s natural gas unbundling experience will influence both the course and timing of electric power industry deregulation. 58
Competition, Competition, Competition
Electric utility executives decry the restructuring of the electric power
industry, emphasizing the differences between the electric and natural gas
Similar Course, OIL & GAS JOURNAL, Mar. 13, 1995, at 66.
155. "The performance of the still-regulated electricity industry during the 1993-94 winter was
almost as disappointing as the gas industry's performance during the winter of 1976-77. The P-J-M
pool, serving the middle Atlantic states, avoided a catastrophic regional blackout only by implementing brownouts and rolling blackouts, and by convincing the federal government, the governments of
several states, and virtually all private businesses in the region to cease all operations for a day."
Richard J. Pierce, The Slate Of The Transition To Competitive Markets In Natural Gas And Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323, at 324-25 (1994).
156. F.E.R.C. began its restructuring of the electric industry on a case by case basis by requiring open access tariffs which provide comparable transmission service before granting the authority to
conduct market based electric power transactions. Heartland Energy Services, Inc., Docket Nos.
ER94-108-000, ER94-475-000, 68 F.E.R.C. 61,223 (Aug. 9, 1994); F.E.R.C. extended its comparability of service requirement to include a comparability of pricing-transmission pricing must meet
the traditional revenue requirement, must reflect comparability, but may promote economic efficiency,
fairness and practicality. F.E.R.C. Powers Ahead With Plans For Competitive Electric Future ...
ENERGY DAILY, Oct. 27, 1994 at 1. See also, Tex-La Electric Cooperative of Texas, Inc., Docket
No. ER94-4-000, et al., 69 F.E.R.C. 61,269 (Dec. 1, 1994); American Electric Power Service
Corp., 67 F.E.R.C. 61,168 (May 11, 1994); El Paso Natural Gas Co., Docket Nos. RP88-184015, et al., 69 F.E.R.C. 61,155 (Nov. 3, 1994); Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Pricing
Policy for Transmission Services Provided by Public Utilities Under the Federal Power Act, Docket
No. RM93-19-000, 69 F.E.R.C. 61,086 (Oct. 26, 1994).
F.E.R.C. has already told Regional Transmission Groups (RTG) that they must meet these
comparability standards set forth in the Mega Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Mega-NOPR). Southwest Regional Transmission Assn., (Order Conditionally Approving Regional Transmission Group
Filing) Docket No. ER94-1381. 69 F.E.R.C. 61,100 (Oct. 27, 1994) and Western Regional Transmission Assn., Order Accepting Compliance Filing, Docket No. ER94-1288, 71 F.E.R.C. 61,158
(May 16, 1995).
Stung by comments of a piecemeal approach to deregulation, F.E.R.C. has recently issued
the electric Mega NOPR, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non Discriminatory Transmission Services By Public Utilities, 70 F.E.R.C. 61,357 (1995); Recovery Of Stranded
Costs By Public Utilities And Transmitting Utilities, 4 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs., Proposed Regulations
32,507 (1994).
157. Mary O'Driscoll, Take Your Medicine, Enron's Kinder Tells Electric Utilities, ENERGY
DAILY, Mar. 8, 1995, at 1; PSI's Rogers Expects Electric Comparability To Mirror Gas Industry,
ENERGY DAILY, June 10, 1994, at 3.
158. Santa: F.E.R.C. No Moses, But Policies Are Guide For New Power Industry, INSIDE
F.E.R.C., Jan. 23, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter F.E.R.C. No Moses].
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industries and expressing fears that restructuring will harm reliability, increase consumer rates, cause electric utility bankruptcies, and generally bring
about the demise of the electric power industry." 9 Electric utility executives
are resorting to the rhetoric of the early natural gas restructuring days;
F.E.R.C. action amounts to a Pearl Harbor attack on the industry.
Unconvinced by these electric utility executive naysayers,"
F.E.R.C.'s vision for the energy industry rests on competition. Indeed,
"the common thread" that runs through all of (F.E.R.C.'s) initiatives in
the post-Energy Policy Act era is "the goal to foster greater competition
in wholesale power markets by means of open access to transmission."' 61
While F.E.R.C. admits that this is an evolutionary process, it plans
to develop "rules of the road" for the restructured electric industry.' 62 If
the deregulation of the electric industry mimics that of the natural gas
industry, what specifically would that include? Since the goal for the
electric industry is competition, the components which fostered competition in the natural gas industry will appear in the electric industry restructuring: comparability, open access transmission, transition costs, marketbased rates, unbundled services, and direct access to customers. In response to deregulation, electric utilities will be streamlined, and downsized, merged, and acquired. Electric utilities will compete with power
marketers for their traditional customers. State regulators will consider
incentive plans and utility rate structure reform. Electricity will become a
commodity.
Square Peg, Round Hole?
There are physical, statutory, and competitive differences between
the electric power industry and the natural gas industry. However, are
these differences so monumental that F.E.R.C. should abandon deregulation of the electric industry, or alter the path it found successful for the
natural gas industry?
Fundamentally, physical differences between electric power and
natural gas exist. Electricity is produced by generators varying in age,
size, and fuel type; pooling of these units has allowed utilities to cut
costs. 163 Electricity is currently limited to regional markets, flows at
159. Bruce Radford, Price or Service?, FoRTNIGHTLY, Sept. 1, 1994, at 5.

160. F.E.R.C. No Moses, supra note 158, at 1.
161.

Id.

162. ENERGY DAILY, Jan. 20, 1995, at 4 (quoting F.E.R.C. Commissioner Donald Santa, at the
January 17 meeting of the Western Energy and Communication Association and Los Angeles Power
Producers Association.).
163.

Pooling "permits a utility peaking at a given time to use the temporary excess capacity of a
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nearly the speed of light, and cannot be stored except at great expense."l
Wholesale generation of electricity is priced competitively, but there is
currently little transmission competition. 65 In comparison, natural gas is
produced from standard wellhead equipment, commands a nationwide
market, is traded as a commodity, and moves on the pipeline transportation grid at 15 to 25 miles per hour. It can be stored and is priced
competitively both by the producer, the transporter, the marketer, and
when possible, the distributor."6
In addition to these physical differences, there are statutory differences. The F.E.R.C. regulates the electric industry under the Federal
Power Act (FPA), amended by the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978 (PURPA) and the Energy Policy Act (EPAct).167 It regulates the
natural gas industry under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), amended by the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol
Act of 1989.61

While limits are placed on F.E.R.C. authority, and state jurisdiction
is recognized by both the FPA and the NGA, 169 fundamental differences
in F.E.R.C.'s jurisdictional and regulatory authority exist over electric
transmission lines and natural gas transportation pipelines." 7 First, elec-

company peaking at a different time . . . . [E]ach intertied utility experiences a decrease in the quantity of generating and reserve capacity required to support the system." Electricity: A New Regulatory
Order?, Congressional Research Service 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1991), at 67.
164. Donald F. Santa and Clifford S. Sikora, Open Access And Transition Costs: Will The Electric Industry Transition Track The Natural Gas Industry Restructuring?, 15 ENERGY L.I. 273, 278
(1994). [hereinafter Santa].
165. Office Of Technology Assessment, Electric Power Wheeling and Dealing: Technological
Considerations For Increasing Competition 36-37 (1989); William L. Massey, Transition To Competition: FederalInitiatives And Industry Opportunities, ELECTRICITY J., Jan. 1993, at 28.
166. Santa, supra note 164.
167. Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-825u (1988); Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUCHA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79z to 79z-6 (1988); Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct), Pub. L.
No. 102-486, §§ 711-31, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
168. Natural Gas Act of 1977 (NGA), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1988); Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
(NGPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988); Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act, Pub. L. No. 101160, 103 Stat. 157 (1989).
169. Section 201(a) of the FPA states that F.E.R.C. authority extends "only to those matters
which are not subject to regulation by the States." Section 201(b) states that unless expressly reserved
under part 11or part III of the FPA, F.E.R.C.'s jurisdiction does not extend "over facilities used for
the generation of electric energy or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed
wholly by the transmitter." 16 U.S.C. §§ 824f(a), 824b(1) (1988). Section 1(b) of the N.G.A. states
that F.E.R.C. jurisdiction does not extend "to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the
local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or
gathering of natural gas." 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1988).
170. Santa, supra note 164, at 288; PSI Energy, Inc., 55 F.E.R.C. 61254, at 61,811 (1991)
("The Commission does not have siting or certification authority with respect to transmission lines
under Part II of the Federal Power Act ... [Tihe Commission's authority is limited to review of the
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tric utility construction-the siting and authorization of transmission facilities-is controlled by state not federal regulation.' 7 ' In comparison,
F.E.R.C. authorizes interstate pipeline construction." r Second, F.E.R.C.
has the specific authority to order electric transmission service (with
certain limitations), but F.E.R.C. can not order access to interstate natural gas transportation service.'73 Until recently, these statutory and regulatory differences have slowed the competitive evolution in the electric
power industry. Bolstered by their experience of deregulating the natural
gas industry, F.E.R.C. is unwilling to be thwarted by these physical and
regulatory differences. Chanting the deregulation mantra of competition,
comparability, and market-based rates, F.E.R.C. has focussed on the
similarities of the electric power industry and the natural gas industry.
Round Peg, Round Hole
Without minimizing the differences, numerous similarities between
the electric power industry and the natural gas industry exist. Both are
energy industries, with a public service obligation. The players in the
electric power industry deregulation are similar to those in the natural gas
industry deregulation: bundled generator/transporter/distributor, independent generators, power marketers, state commissioners, and F.E.R.C.
commissioners. Both comprise of three functions: generation (production),
transmission (transportation), and distribution. Currently, the electric
power industry is "bundled" or vertically integrated-similar to a prerestructured natural gas company, with all three functions in one corporate entity.
Further, a monopoly exists at the transmission and distribution functions of the electric industry (similar to the bundled natural gas industry)
which hinders competition.174 Transmission and distribution functions remain effective monopolies and therefore "continue to be subject to traditional forms of regulation because (they) must be integrated in order to
rates, terms and conditions of jurisdictional agreements to ensure that they are just and reasonable and
not unduly discriminatory or preferential."); 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1988) (Federal regulation shall extend to part of electric utility business "which consists of the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce . . . " However, such
federal regulation extends "only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the states.")
171. Id.
172. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717f(b), 717f(c), 717f(e), 717f(h) (1988).
173. Section 211 of FHA; Policy Statement Regarding Regional Transmission Groups,
3 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,976, at 30,869 (1993). "[S]ection 211 of the FPA ... gave the
Commission general authority to order electric utilities to provide transmission to, inter alia, other
electric utilities." Id. [EPAct] has significantly expanded the Commission's authority to order transmission services under section 211.
174. Santa, supra note 164, at 282.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol31/iss1/2

38

Pendley: Deregulation of the Energy Industry
1996

DEREGULATION OF THE ENERGY INDUSTRY

achieve society's preferred level of reliability, and because economies of
scale dictate that duplication is an inefficient way to provide the necessary
services."' 75 Faced with comparability, open access and unbundling, electric industry transition Costs 7 6 will range between $200 to $300 billion
dollars. 7"

Convinced by these similarities, F.E.R.C. has set out to deregulate
the electric industry in record time. 7 1 In some respects, the deregulation
of the electric industry may be easier than the natural gas industry restructuring.
First, Congress has already made the decision to mandate equal ac-

cess to transmission lines (the comparability "golden rule") and to create
a competitive wholesale market. Second, most state PUCs have already
made the decision to rely on competitive contracting as the primary vehicle for adding new generating capacity. Finally, the F.E.R.C. has already
authorized firms to charge market-based wholesale electricity prices when
it finds that the firms confront sufficient competition."

175. Santa, supra note 164, at 282. "[l]n theory, the fact that the transportation function is a
monopoly means that transmission-owning electric utilities and natural gas pipelines are able to maintain market power in the transportation product market, and may exercise market power in the product markets for delivered gas or electricity as a result of transportation market power." Id.
176. Electric utility transition costs will arise from (1) utility assets, regulatory assets and other
costs ... made uneconomic as a result of competition in generation markets; and (2) loss of market
to competing sellers with access to new purchasers through enhanced electric transmission services;
and (3) contracts to purchase power from third parties at above market prices." Id. at 295 n. 109.
177, Richard J. Pierce, The Stare Of The Transition To Competitive Markets In Natural Gas And
Electricity, 15 ENERGY L.J. 323, 337 (1994) [hereinafter Piercel.
178. Deregulation of the natural gas industry occurred over a number of years: beginning with
fully integrated companies (production, transportation, distribution) offering wellhead to burnertip services, the 1970s surplus and shortages, Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1979, the 1987 Order
No. 436 voluntary open access on gas pipelines, Order No. 500, and culminating in 1992 with Order
No. 636 which unbundled pipeline sales from pipeline transportation service. Using natural gas deregulation as a guide, many believe that the deregulation of the electric industry will be completed in less
than five years. However, there are some who warn that the upheaval is so great, that the electric industry will do everything possible to delay the inevitable. Dennis Wamstead, Production Costs Point
To Competitive Winners-Moody's, ENERGY DAILY, Nov. 1, 1994, at 3; Pierce, supra note 177, at
338-49.
179. Pierce, supra note 177, at 329; EPAct §§ 711-726; American Electric Power Service
Corp., 67 F.E.R.C. 61,168 (May 11, 1994) (Order on Rehearing and Clarification) stated that an
open access tariff must offer third parties access on a comparable basis, under the same terms and
conditions as the transmission provider's use of the system and the cost of transmission must not be
unduly discriminatory or anticompetitive. See also Jeffery D. Watkiss and Douglas W. Smith, The
Energy Policy Act of 1992: A WatershedFor Competition In The Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE
J. ON REG. 447 (1993); Paul Joskow, Regulatory Failure,Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change
In The Electrical Power Industry, Brookings Paper On Econ. Activity, Microeconomics 125 (1989);
Environmental Action v. F.E.R.C., 996 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Town Of Norwood v. F.E.R.C.,
962 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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In the natural gas industry, F.E.R.C. broke through this transportation/distribution monopoly by mandating competition, through comparability of service and unbundling."0 Convinced by its experience deregulating the natural gas industry that the transmission/distribution monopoly
will be erased by introducing competition to mitigate market power,
F.E.R.C. took its first step to deregulate the electric utility industry on
March 29, 1995 with the electric Mega-Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(Mega-NOPR).181
The Electric Mega-NOPR
The electric Mega-NOPR "Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services By
Public Utilities" and "Recovery Of Stranded Costs By Public Utilities
And Transmitting Utilities" commits F.E.R.C. to a policy of reliance on
market driven factors rather than regulatory control in its desire to restructure the electric industry."
As a basis for F.E.R.C.'s proposed rules, it states that:
We find that utilities owning or controlling transmission facilities
possess substantial market power; that, as profit maximizing firms,
they have and will continue to exercise that market power in order to
maintain and increase market share, and will thus deny their wholesale customers access to competitively priced electric generation; and
that these unduly discriminatory practices will deny consumers the
substantial benefits of lower electricity prices. 83
As currently written, the proposal affects only the transmission of power
to wholesale customers (big industrial plants), not retail customers (residential homeowners)." 8 However, F.E.R.C. expects that opening wholesale competition may force the unbundling of the electric industry at the
local level, and in time, lower the cost of electricity for all customers.'

180. See supra text accompanying note 3.
181. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities, Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
Docket Nos. RM95-8-O00 and RM94-7-001, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,662
(Apr. 7, 1995), 4 F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs.
32,514 (1995) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
[hereinafter NOPR].
182. NOPR. supra note 181, 33,052.
183. Id.
184. Id.
33,078 and 33,081.
185. Id. 33,082.
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The NOPR proposes specific changes. First, NOPR requires public
utilities to file open access non-discriminatory transmission tariffs. These
tariffs must provide point-to-point, network, and ancillary services.
F.E.R.C. would set rates for service in the pro forma generic tariffs
based on a standard formula, using company-specific Form 1 data."s
Second, NOPR requires Public utilities to take transmission service for
their own wholesale transactions under their open access tariff."n Third,
NOPR allows the public utilities to have an opportunity to recover stranded investment associated with the open access tariff requirement. Recognizing that it would be unfair to penalize utilities for reliance upon past
regulatory structure, F.E.R.C. would permit the recovery of "legitimate
and verifiable" stranded investment from departing wholesale customers,
provided that the utility could demonstrate "reasonable expectation" of
continuing to serve a departing customer.' 88 Taking note of its natural gas
deregulation experience, the Mega-NOPR does not propose to terminate
existing contracts but rather, proposes that all existing wholesale contracts
remain in full force and effect until naturally terminated." 9
The key element in allowing market forces to work is the pricing
terms and conditions under which transmission facilities are used. This
Mega-NOPR addresses transmission access and transmission pricing;, 90 it
doesn't address generation or distribution. Support of this Mega-NOPR
will vary depending on the utility's competitive generation prices and the
position of the utility as a high price or low price producer of energy in
an open transmission grid.9'
ElectricityAs A Commodity
Energy must be viewed as a commodity. As natural gas has become
a commodity, traded on NYMEX (New York Mercantile Exchange) and

186. Point-to-point rates would be "postage-stamp" rather than "distance sensitive." Id.;
F.E.R.C. proposes a two step process for filing the open access tariffs: (1) each public utility which
owns or operates a transmission system will be required to file an open access tariff in generic format
to be effective sixty days after the effective date of the final rule; (2) Sixty-one days after the final
rule becomes effective, utilities are free to propose Section 205 changes in the rates, terms and conditions in the generic tariff and customers are free to file Section 206 complaints seeking changes. Id.
33,146.
187. Id. 33,980.
Id.

33,117.

189. Id.

33,093.

188.

190. Id. 33,078.
191. Initial comments on the NOPR were due on August 7, 1995 and reply comments were due
on October 4, 1995. If the natural gas deregulation pattern is followed, the final order expected in the

spring of 1996 will likely be quite similar to the March 29th NOPR, requiring mandatory unbundling
of services and the provision of open access transmission services.
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subject to derivatives,"n so will electricity.'93 "[A] spot market in electricity will evolve. . .[w]ith prices revealed; a commodity market will follow.
With spot and commodity markets will come the power to reallocate risk
and make capital investment more productive. " 94
NYMEX is developing an electric futures contract."'9 An electric futures market will allow the purchase and sale of specified quantities of
commodities for future delivery at a specific location.' 96 Prices will be determined by competitive bidding. The actual transaction prices will be instantly disseminated throughout the world and serve as a benchmark for
commodity value."9 According to NYMEX, "introducing risk management tools into the electric industry is a natural outgrowth of the competition currently being fostered."' 98 While F.E.R.C. insists that it does not
have jurisdiction over derivative instruments in power markets, it is concerned about investment banking firms seeking marketer status so they
can conduct derivative transactions-futures, options, and other risk-hedging mechanisms."'
Generation
Currently, the electric power industry is a vertically integrated industry: generation, transmission, and distribution owned by one corporate
entity. This structure is incompatible with competition. Therefore, competition and open access transmission will drive the unbundling of the electric utility industry into three separate entities-generation, transmission,
distribution-causing a vertical disintegration of the electric utility industry.' While the move to separate generation assets from their transmis-

192. Derivatives "are complex hedging instruments, such as futures, options, and swaps, used
to defray the risk of changes in interest rates, stock prices, foreign-exchange rates and commodities
prices." Citizens, Lehman Bros. Form Venture For Power Marketing, Derivatives, INDEPENDENT
POWER REPORT, Sept. 23, 1994, at 7.
193. "The coming commoditization of electric power will unbundle price risk from electricity as
a 'good.' If utilities don't do it,
new market intermediaries will." Mango, Bob and John Woodley,
The Inevitable Commoditization Of Electric Power Markets, FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 1, 1994, at 27.

[hereinafter Mango].
194.

Id.

195. Lori A. Burkhart, NIMEX Prepares To Launch The Electric Future, FORTNIGHTLY, July
15, 1994, at 39. See also Mango, supra note 193, at 27.

196. See Burkhart, supra note 195.
197. Id.

198. Id.
199. Moler Has Concerns On Derivatives, But Says F.E.R.C. Lacks Jurisdiction, ELECTRIC
UTILITY WEEK, Jan. 23, 1995, at 11; Massey Urges F.E.R.C. Look At Derivative Instruments, Decide
Whether To Worry, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Jan. 16, 1995, at 2.
200. N. Y. Sees End Of Vertical Integration; Backs Stranded-Investment Recovery, ELECTRIC
UTILITY WEEK,

Jan. 9, 1995, at 5 [hereinafter N.Y.]; Richard J.Rudden, Competition In The Electric
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sion and distribution units is supported by state commissions, 2°" independent power producers,' and power marketers, it is feared by many vertically integrated investor owned utilities. Investor owned utilities foresee
competition forcing unbundling, increased business risk, the spin off and
downsizing of corporate entities, the need for unbundled market flexible
rates, the erosion of their historic customer base once direct access or
customer choice is attained at the distribution level, and the overriding
concern of stranded costs. 3
There have been a number of proposals to disintegrate the electric
utility.' Each recognizes the issue of transition costs. "[P]art of managing the regulatory transition to a more competitive environment is providing a mechanism for natural gas pipelines and electric utilities to recover
legitimate costs incurred to honor sales obligations under the old regime." 2°5 It is the issue of transition costs, which to a large extent, will
shape the deregulation of the electric power industry.
Transmission: Functional Unbundling
The electric Mega-NOPR does not demand that a vertically integrated electric utility unbundle corporately.' However, by demanding open
access, comparable service and comparable pricing for transmission, it is
Markets, ENERGY DAILY, Oct. 28, 1994, at 1; FORTNIGHTLY, Oct. 1, 1994 at 38; North American
National Independent Power Groups Stress Separating Utility Functions, INDEPENDENT POWER REPORT, June 17, 1994, at 8.

201. See N.Y., supra note 200.
202. AES: Real Reform Requires Splitting Generation From Transmission And Distribution,
ENERGY DAILY, July 12, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter AESI.

203. Id.
204. AES, supra note 202. One plan suggested by an independent producer requires the utility "to sell
off its generation assets, and to sign a long-term contract, which would include an immediate rate reduction
of 5 percent to buy power from the purchaser. The utility would be allowed to sell its generation assets as a
single entity, in packages or as individual units; it would be guaranteed at least book value for all of these
assets
....[l1f the contract prices were set at a level that equaled the long-run marginal cost of generation... there would be no stranded asset cost charged to ratepayers. A long-term contract would increase
the value of the plant to potential purchasers, and they would bid a higher price for the plant to the selling
utility. After the contracts expire, the facilities must negotiate new contracts at competitive market rates and
terms or must sell on the spot market." This plan would preclude direct access or retail wheeling -either
would allow the customer to bypass these contracts for lower priced generation options. Richard A. Abdoo,
Wisconsin Electric's View Of A More Competitive Industry, FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 15, 1995, at 17. Wisconsin
into natural monopolies and competitive
Electric envisions 'splitting today's vertically integrated utilities
entities;" it also considered "re-regulated entities." Id. NIEP Says Transmission Charges Best Way To Recoup StrandedInvestment, INDEPENDENT POWER REPORT, Dec. 16, 1994, at 5. The National Independent
Energy Producers trade group wants utilities todivest themselves of generation assets, placing any unrecovered, stranded costs in transmission-related charges to be paid by all users of the transmission system. Id.
205. See Santa, supra note 164, at 295.
206. See NOPR, supra note 181, 133,080. "F.E.R.C. does note that many utilities might ultimately choose to disintegrate." Id.
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pushing the electric utility into functional unbundling. Functional
unbundling requires: (1) the transmission facilities owner take transmission services for all of its new wholesale transactions under the same
tariff under which third parties take similar service; (2) open access tariffs
must separately state rates for transmission and ancillary service components of each transmission service that it provides; and (3) the utility must
rely upon the same electronic network as its transmission customers to
2°
obtain transmission information about its system. W
F.E.R.C. recognizes that the NOPR will necessarily establish two
separate transmission arrangements: a wholesale transmission tariff
filed with F.E.R.C. and retail transmission regulation governed by
state commissions." Anticipating retail wheeling,' F.E.R.C. will
exercise jurisdiction over the sale of unbundled transmission capacity
in interstate commerce but exercise no control over the sale of
unbundled generation at retail.21 0
Stranded Costs
Having learned first-hand of the upheaval caused by ignoring stranded costs until late in the deregulation of natural gas industry (Order No.
636),11 F.E.R.C. determined not to repeat that error again. In the MegaNOPR, F.E.R.C. asserts its duty to address stranded costs.2" 2 Having
reassured the electric utility industry that they will be able to recover
stranded costs, F.E.R.C. discussed three alternatives in the electric MegaNOPR for allocation2"3 and then chose to allocate the stranded costs di-

207.
208.

Id. 1 33,080-33,081.
Id. 1 33,081.

209. End users arranging for their local utility to purchase generation from a third party supplier of the end user's choice on terms negotiated by the end user, transmit that energy in interstate
commerce, and then resell it as part of a bundled retail sale to the end user (buy-sell transaction). Id.
33,082.
210.

Id.

211. In its initial attempt at deregulating the natural gas market, F.E.R.C. did not address the
transition costs associated with the burden of uneconomic take-or-pay contracts negotiated by the
pipelines during a natural gas shortage period in the 1970s. Order No. 436, Regulation Of Natural
Gas Pipelines After PartialWellhead Decontrol, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs., Regulations Preamble

30,665 at 31,492-93 (1985), vacated and remanded sub. nom., Associated Gas Distributors v.
F.E.R.C., 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).

212. F.E.R.C. first raised this issue in its original stranded cost recovery NOPR - issued
months before the Mega-NOPR. Recovery Of Stranded Costs By Public Utilities And Transmitting
Utilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,274 (July 11, 1994) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § pt. 35). F.E.R.C. uses
the date, July 11, 1994, as a benchmark for determining old or new contracts. Id.

213. The three choices were as follows: (1) Do nothing, thereby allocating the burden to shareholders; (2) Allocate the stranded costs directly to the departing wholesale customer; (3) Allocate the
costs over a wider group of customers - all customers, all transmission customers, or various other
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rectly to the departing wholesale customer. This is exactly opposite of the
position taken by F.E.R.C. in the deregulation of the natural gas industry. 214 F.E.R.C. then proposed to divide recovery of stranded costs into
two categories: old wholesale power sales contracts (pre July 1511, 1994)
and new wholesale power sales contracts (post July 11, 1994).

F.E.R.C. proposes that recoverable stranded costs should be based
on a 'revenues lost' approach rather than a hypothetical cost of service
approach. 2 6 The utility has an obligation to mitigate its stranded costs by
marketing stranded power supplies at competitive market value. Recoverable costs include not only the actual costs incurred by the utility in the
expectation of continuing to serve the customer but also includes a return
on equity at the rate which was previously approved by F.E.R.C. in the
wholesale contract.217

F.E.R.C. has refused to consider retail stranded cost determinations.
It stated that it will only exercise authority to recover stranded costs occasioned by retail wheeling in the instance in which a state regulatory authority lacks the authority to do so. However, it asserts that it does have
authority over stranded costs caused by 'retail-turned-wholesale' customers (municipalizations)." 8
Comments filed on the original stranded cost NOPR preview the
comments to be expected in August on the Mega-NOPR. Investor-owned
utilities (IOU) state that "recovery of stranded costs would promote parity
pricing."219 Taking exception to F.E.R.C.'s position that it lacks jurisdic-

combinations. See NOPR, supra note 181.

214. F.E.R.C. justified spreading stranded costs over all existing transmission customers because its seven year delay in addressing transition costs had caused significant upheaval in the industry. See Order No. 636, supra note 6.
215.

See NOPR supra note 181. F.E.R.C. will allow stranded cost recovery for contracts en-

tered into after July 11, 1994 only if the contract contains explicit stranded cost recovery provisions.
Id. Therefore, firm requirements customers will be responsible for planning their own power needs
beyond the end of any particular contract term, and the wholesale supplier will be free at the end of
such contract term to sell its power on the open market. F.E.R.C. will allow stranded cost recovery
for contracts entered into prior to July 11, 1994 if the old contract includes a stranded cost provision
or if the utility can demonstrate that it had a reasonable expectation of continuing to serve a departed
customer. Id. A reasonable expectation standard will be decided on a case by case basis using a totality of the circumstances test. Factors such as whether the customer had access to alternate suppliers,
the parties actual course of negotiation and performance, and communications regarding system planning will be used. Id.
216. Id.

217. Id.
218. F.E.R.C. will define local distribution facilities pursuant to Section 201 (b)(1) of the Federal Power Act. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)(1988).
219. Opposing Sides Remain Firmly Entrenched In Stranded-Cost Struggle, INSIDE F.E.R.C.,
Feb. 6, 1995, at 8.
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tion over stranded retail costs, the IOUs further conclude that costs associated with generation facilities-included stranded costs-could be included in F.E.R.C.-jurisdictional rates. 20 However, the American Public
Power Association states that, "[Slo-called stranded cost recovery is a
matter that is already dealt with satisfactorily in existing contracts, and recovery of retail stranded costs should be dealt with by the states."2'

Some state commissions view stranded costs as a state issue. They
argue that federally mandated competition caused the decrease in generation and distribution assets-assets which are regulated by the states.n2
Distribution:DeregulationAt The Local Level: Retail Wheeling-PoolcoBuy/Sell223

With electric prices higher than the national average unbundling will
appear at the local level. Retail wheeling-unbundling of electric power at
the retail level-is a concept which is already being considered by a number of state commissions.' Out in front, the California Public Utilities
220. Id.
221. Mary O'Driscoll, FERC Learned The Wrong Lesson From Gas Deregulation, ENERGY
DAILY, Dec. 12, 1994, at 1.
222. "Stranded investment may be dealt with by a . mixture of ... causing the utility to
write-off, write-down or sell (at market value) some of its assets; recovering stranded investment
through entry and exit fees on "defectors" from the utility; .. .recovering stranded investment in
transmission and distribution charges on all consumers. .. ;and allowing utilities to find new profitable markets to offset their shares of the stranded investment, such as offering onsite generation services, cogeneration, DSM, . . . at a profit." Forum, FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 15, 1994, at 50 (quoting
Marcia Weeks, Chairman, Arizona Corporation Commission).
223. Retail Wheeling provides direct access to power supply for all consumers. The California
"Blue Book" retail wheeling proposal ("Proposed Policies Governing Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry and Reforming Regulation, R.94-04-031, 1.94-04-032, Apr. 20, 1994) would
allow large customers with transmission levels above 50 kilovolts to buy their own electric power
through retail wheeling. By 2002, all customers would be allowed to choose their electric supplier.
The plan calls for an unbundling of services and rates and a division of customers into core and
noncore groups. Customers may choose to receive bundled services from their certificated utility or to
require only those services they need to receive electric power they purchase elsewhere. The California proposal couples market pricing for competitive services and performance-based ratemaking for
existing services. California electric companies have found this controversial industry restructuring
plan acceptable; although they want to push back the date for full retail wheeling from 2002 to 2008.
California Utilities Cautiously Embrace Restructuring ProposalMaybe It Isn't Such A Bad Idea After
All, ENERGY DAILY, June 9, 1994, at I [hereinafter Maybe].
Poolco is an independent regional power pool company tomanage the wholesale power market. Utilities would continue to own their own lines but Poolco would manage their use. Poolco
would provide a spot power price and would flow the power through distribution companies toretail
customers in the same bundled way customers now receive it. As each company joins Poolco, it
would separate transmission grid assets from distribution assets, using a principle based on where
system congestion can be created.
Buy/Sell is a transmission-distribution transaction which will allow eligible customers to
choose from any supplier of electricity inside or outside California, including their local utilities.
224. Phillip S.Cross, Retail Wheeling-Happy Motoring For State Regulators?, FORTNIGHTLY,

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol31/iss1/2

46

Pendley: Deregulation of the Energy Industry

1996

DEREGULATION OF THE ENERGY INDUSTRY

Commission has proposed the "Blue Book" plan which will restructure
the electric power industry, allowing direct access to all customers (regardless of their size) by 2002.1
Proponents of competition, direct access and therefore, retail wheeling are nonutility generators, power marketers,' and large electric customers. Opponents of retail wheeling are utility management who fear the
end of the regulated monopoly,227 conservationists and environmentalists
June 15, 1994, at 46; Wheeling Update, FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 15, 1994, at 49; Bruce Radford, Regulatory Dreams, FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 15, 1994, at 6. California has taken the lead on retail wheeling.
States whose state commissions or state legislature have addressed retail wheeling are as follows:
Connecticut (Retail Electric Transmission Service, Docket No. 93-09-29, Jan. 27, 1994; Final decision: retail wheeling would not serve the public interest because of excess generating capacity
and potential stranded investment. September 9, 1994; Informal Roundtable Studies of Retail Wheeling Ordered, January 17, 1995, Docket No. 94-12-13);
Illinois (Changes in the Structure of the Electric Energy Industry, No.94-RI, April 20, 1994);
Massachusetts (Proposal to "Rent" Transmission and Distribution Access to Customers or
Power Suppliers, DPU 94-162, Mass. Energy Agency Puts ForwardRetail Wheeling Plan; Wire Rental, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Jan. 9, 1995, at 11.);
Michigan (Experimental Program for Consumers Power Co. and Detroit Edison Co.; Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity, 150 PUR4th 409, 1994);
New York (Competitive Opportunities, Case 93-M-0229, August 9, 1994);
Nevada (State Legislature - Limited Retail Wheeling Statute, S.B. 231 - Fears About State
Reciprocity Have Killed The ProspectsFor Retail Wheeling This Year; Nevada Legislator Nires Retail
Wheeling, For Now; Fears About State Reciprocity Have Killed The Prospects For Retail Wheeling
This Year, ENERGY DAILY, Mar. 13, 1995, at 4; State Commission - Docket No. 94-6024);
Ohio (State Legislature - H.B. 676);
Texas ("Self Service Wheeling," Houston Lighting & Power Co., Docket No. 12138,
Dec. 22, 1993);
Utah (Pacificorp, No. 90-2035-01, June 1, 1993);
Vermont (Citizens Utilities Co., Docket No. 5625, March 28, 1994);
Wisconsin (Docket No. 05-EI-114).
Bruce Radford, Regulatory Dreams, FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 15, 1994, at 6.
225. See Maybe, supra note 223.
226. Power marketers encourage competition alleging that limiting transmission access is an
industry-wide problem requiring an industry-wide solution. Mary O'Driscoll, Power Marketers Seek
Generic ComparabilityRule, ENERGY DAILY, Feb. 17, 1995, at 1. F.E.R.C. determined that an affiliate will not be permitted to collect market-based rates for bulk-power sales unless its transmission
owner has filed an open-access transmission tariff offering comparable services (Hermiston Generat61,035 (Oct. 13, 1994)). W. Lynn
ing Company, L.P., Docket No. ER94-950-000, 69 F.E.R.C.
Garner, "Comparability" Required For Affiliate Bulk-Power Sales, FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 15, 1994, at
63. Asserting that quarterly activity and affiliate activity reports inhibit competition, power marketer
affiliates are seeking a "lighter" regulatory hand, more akin to their natural gas marketer affiliate
brethren under Order No. 497. Mary O'Driscoll, UtilitiesLook To Enter Power Marketing Business,
ENERGY DAILY, Nov. 7, 1994, at 1.
227. Understandably, utility management are concerned about the erosion of their traditional
customer base, and stranded costs, including suggestions that stranded costs be 'shared' by wheeling
customers, core customers, and utility shareholders. Kenneth W. Costello, Robert E. Bums, and
Youssef Hegazy, How State Regulators Should Handle Retail Wheeling, FoRTNIGHTLY, Feb. 15,
1995, at 26-28. However, the fear of retail wheeling "seems to be declining within the industry as
more people realize that discount pricing and expanding customer bases are the keys to survival in the
newly competitive power marketplace." Survey Says Fear Of Retail Wheeling On Decline Within
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who fear the end of the electric power societal programs such as demand
side management (DSM) and integrated resource planning (IRP).2
Unbundling of electric power at the local level will give rise to those
issues which are also being faced by state commissions in the unbundling
of the natural gas industry: competition, affiliate relationships, unbundled
tariffs, market-based rates, stranded costs, incentive plans, integrated resource plans and demand side management, core and non-core customers,
and the obligation to serve.
Of primary importance to the electric industry is the distribution
company's obligation to serve. Competition and direct access alters the
traditional obligation to serve. The obligation to serve is "the foundation
for the concept of regulation. However, it presumes that the utility is a
monopoly." 22 9 Under the California Blue Book plan, utilities would retain
their duty to serve customers who continue to receive bundled, tariffed
utility service." But the duty to serve direct access customers would be
modified to avoid seriously hampering a utility's ability to plan for and
reliably serve its remaining customers."
State/FederalJurisdiction
Electric power industry unbundling issues are compounded by the
necessity to resolve state/federal jurisdictional conflicts allowing competition at the local level and full implementation of direct access proposals.
Once unbundling of the vertically integrated electric power industry-driven by comparable service requirements and open access tariffs-occurs at the transmission level, F.E.R.C. will have to identify the
line between state and federal jurisdiction over retail transmission.
F.E.R.C. recognizes the need for redefinition of regulatory responsibilities between state and federal regulators: "Jurisdictional questions are
very very difficult because historically we haven't had to define those
boundaries. ""
Utility Industry, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Jan. 16, 1995, at 5.

228. The surcharges and central planning necessary to support IRP and DSM have no place in a
competitive market. However, conservationists and environmentalists' objectives will be met when
competition encourages the use of fuel-efficient new generating technologies. Charles M. Studness,
Political Alliances And The Struggle Over Competition, FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 1, 1994, at 28; Eric
Hirst, Retail Competition May Put DSM Out Of Business, FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 15, 1994, at 14.

229. John G. Strand, Retail Wheeling: A View From Michigan, FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 15, 1994,
at 29, 33.

230. See Maybe, supra note 223.
231. Id. at 29. The proposal also requires a twelve month notice period for those customers who
wish to return to bundled service status or for those bundled service customers who wish to retum to
direct access status.
232. Chris Newkumetg, Moler Anticipates Sweeping Rule To Restructure Electric Industry, IN-
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The uneven application of federal/state authority over the transmission and sale of electricity increased jurisdictional issues. F.E.R.C.'s
exercise of its new authority under the EPAct to order open access
transmission on a comparability-of-service basis encourages competition
in the electric industry. 3 The FPA grants the F.E.R.C. authority to determine just and reasonable rates for the transmission of electricity in
interstate commerce. 4 However, F.E.R.C. is still prohibited from mandating retail wheeling, and it does not have power to authorize construction or expansion of transmission lines. 2"
The federal/state jurisdictional issue has spawned greater obligations
for state regulators to revise traditional modes of regulation to accommodate the emergence of a robust, competitive, wholesale power market.
However, the state commissions are not in agreement on how to redefine
regulatory responsibilities between state and federal regulators. A Colorado Commissioner believes that "an orderly and equitable shift to a market-based electric service industry will require federal intervention." 6 A
Wyoming Commissioner believes that "regional and subregional
groups-working together to tackle regional and subregional problems-offer better hope of good, rational solutions." 2" An Ohio Commissioner believes that the federal/state joint board process should be used to
develop federal/state policies based on contractual relationships.s An
Illinois Commissioner believes that the issues should be resolved by the
states; ". . .restrict[ing] F.E.R.C.'s responsibility to interstate movement
of energy, with all other questions (stranded investment, access charges,

SIDE F.E.R.C., Jan. 30, 1995, at 1.
233. Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct), Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 711-31, 106 Stat. 2776
(1992).
234. Currently most electricity is transmitted as a bundled sales transaction giving little opportunity to resolve jurisdictional disputes over transmission rates. Courts have interpreted "interstate
broadly to include any transaction within a single state if the transaction makes use of interconnected
transmission lines in which the potential exists for commingling with electricity from an out-of-state
source." Practically speaking, these holdings give F.E.R.C. "plenary power over virtually all electricity wholesales in the continental United States." Pierce, supra note 177, at 331.
235. Not everyone agrees that states have the authority to order retail wheeling. "The FPA
grants the F.E.R.C. jurisdiction to regulate transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce,
and several Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that all transmission of electric energy by
utilities connected to interstate transmission grid is transmission in interstate commerce." FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 15, 1994, at 55 (quoting Christine Alvarez, Commissioner, Colorado Public Utilities Commission); F.E.R.C. General Counsel Tomasky believes that it is a "question of interpretation." RestructuringF.E.R. C., States Struggle To Find Common Ground As West Starts Restructuring, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Jan. 23, 1995, at 8 [hereinafter States Struggle] (quoting Susan Temasky, General Council).
236. See States Struggle, supra note 235.
237.

Id.

238. Id.
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timing for retail wheeling, and so on) left to local government, where the
impact of those decisions would be most keenly felt."239
The federal/state issue embroiled in the competitive realignment of
the electric power industry will be tempered by the "new federalism" led
by the Republican Congress which intends to give more policy responsibility to the states. Power sales are increasingly accorded the rights of the
open market, the electric power industry is operating under new transmission access regulations, and the F.E.R.C. is acting as arbiter in debates
over multi-million dollar wheeling transactions across state lines. 2' Perhaps Congress will end this debate with legislation which delineates the
boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction.
It is possible for F.E.R.C. and the states to work out these jurisdictional issues. Certainly, F.E.R.C.'s disclaimer of authority over retail
wheeling in its open access transmission NOPR was a step forward. However, the courts may have to resolve the electric power jurisdictional issues by establishing a new "bright line test that confers on the F.E.R.C.
plenary power over the rates and conditions of service for all transactions
that use a high voltage transmission line. .., including retail wheeling
transactions and transactions that purport to involve only transmission
from one point to another in a single state." 24' Perhaps nothing short of
an amendment to the FPA giving F.E.R.C. the same powers with respect
to transmission projects that it has under the NGA for gas pipeline projects will resolve the conflict. 2
DeregulationOf The Energy Industry
The F.E.R.C. vision of competition and market-based rates in the
natural gas industry discussed in Parts 1, 2, and 3 of this paper will be
repeated in the deregulation of the electric power industry. Electric utilities will be disintegrated; generation, transmission, and distribution functions will be unbundled. In response to competition, electric utilities will
downscale, spinoff, and spin down assets. Open access, comparability of
service and rates will allow competition on wholesale transmission lines.

239. Id.
240. Mary O'Driscoll, Electric Utilities Running Counter To The 'New Federalism' Trend, ENERGY DAILY, Jan. 3, 1995, at 1.
241. Pierce, supra note 177, at 331.

242. Id. at 334. A related movement is afoot to increase competition in the electric power industry by repealing PUHCA (Public Utility Holding Company Act) and PURPA (Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act). Libertarian Group With Ties To GOP Calls For Repeal Of PUHCA, PURPA, ELECTRIC UTILtTY WEEK, Jan. 9, 1995, at 5; IndustrialsDraw Line In The Sand On PUHCA, PURPA,

ENERGY DAILY, Feb. 2, 1995, at 1.
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Retail wheeling, poolco, or buy/sell arrangements will allow customers of
all sizes direct access to more inexpensively priced electric power. Electricity, like natural gas, will become a commodity offered on NYMEX
with futures trading. By reviewing the process followed by the F.E.R.C.
in the deregulation of the natural gas industry, the path through the deregulation of the electric power industry will become evident.
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